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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LABOR IN THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING EARLY COLD WAR: THE 
MARSHALL PLAN AND AMERICAN-TURKISH LABOR RELATIONS 
1945-1955 
 
 
Öner, Sera  
 
M.A., Department of History 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof Edward P. Kohn 
 
September 2006 
 
 
 
 
American foreign policy, parallel to the rise of the working class as of the 
1860s, has included a new policy actor: labor. Likewise, in the aftermath of World 
War II and emergence of bipolar world, the United States of America actively made 
use of labor unions and rendered it an intrinsic Cold War value.  
This thesis describes America’s use of labor tool in its struggle against 
communism after providing a general account of labor movement and its role in 
American foreign policy making, through descriptive history method. 
Major objective of the United States was to redress Europe through military 
and economic aid vis-à-vis the specter of communism, to secure the periphery and 
contain the U.S.S.R. The road map of this new American global strategy became a 
monolithic one with the Marshall Plan and indoctrinated with the Truman Doctrine, 
which also included the labor element.  
The thesis will analyze the significant role that labor in the U.S. foreign 
policy, shaped with American exceptionalism; its development and support for the 
anti-communism policies. The reason why this thesis has been written is that there is 
no written source elaborating Turkish-American industrial relations from the 
perspective of Cold War. With this end, by making use of comparative history 
method, Turkish industrial relations case is studied to illustrate the know-how 
assistance and ideology trade-off of America to Turkish labor unions, which 
highlights the importance ascribed by the U.S.A. to labor as a foreign policy 
component.   
 
Keywords: the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, foreign policy labor, 
industrial relations, Cold War, Turkish-American Relations, Irving Brown,.  
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ÖZET 
 
ERKEN SOĞUK SAVAŞ DÖNEMİ AMERİKAN DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA İŞÇİ 
SENDİKALARI: MARSHALL PLANI VE TÜRK-AMERİKAN ENDÜSTRİYEL 
İLİŞKİLERİ  
1945-1955 
 
 
Öner, Sera 
 
M.A., Tarih Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Edward P. Kohn 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
 
 
 
Amerikan dış politikası, 1860’lardan itibaren işçi sınıfının yükselmesine 
paralel olarak yeni bir politika aktörü daha geliştirmiştir: endüstriyel ilişkiler. Keza, 
İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında iki kutuplu bir dünya düzeninin ortaya çıkması 
sonucu, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, aktif bir şekilde endüstriyel ilişkileri ve işçi 
sendikalarını kullanmış, sendikaları Soğuk Savaş’ın ayrılmaz bir değeri haline 
getirmiştir.  
Bu tez, Amerikan işçi hareketi ve dış politikada oynadığı role genel olarak 
değindikten sonra, Amerika’nın komünizmle mücadelesinde işçi sendikaları ve 
endüstriyel ilişkileri nasıl kullandığını, betimleyici tarih metoduna göre ele 
almaktadır.  
1945 yılında, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin en büyük amacı, Avrupa’yı 
komünizm tehlikesi karşısında askeri ve ekonomik açıdan ayağa kaldırmak, kendi 
çevresini güvenceye almak ve S.S.C.B.’yi sınırlandırmaktı. Bu yeni Amerikan 
küresel stratejisinin yol haritası Marshall Planı ile tek vücud haline getirilmiş ve 
Truman Doktrini ile doktrinleştirilmiştir.  
Bu tez, işçi sendikalarının ve emek hayatının, Amerika’nın istisnai olduğu 
fikriyle şekillendirilmiş olan A.B.D. dış politikasında oynadığı rolün önemini, 
gelişimini ve komünizm karşıtı politikalara verdiği desteği inceleyecektir. Bu amaçla, 
Türk endüstriyel ilişkileri bir vaka çalışması olarak ele alınarak Amerika’nın Türk 
sendikalarına sağladığı bilgi birikimi ve ideoloji aktarımı başarısı incelenecek, 
A.B.D.’nin dış politikasında endüstriyel ilişkilere verdiği önemin altı çizilecektir.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Marshall Planı, Truman Doktirini, dış politika, emek, işçi 
sendikaları, endüstriyel ilişkiler, Soğuk Savaş, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Irving 
Brown. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
In the aftermath of 1945, Cold War blocks were incrementally being built, 
and there was a growing fear of communism in Europe and Turkey. With the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, Turkey and Greece had been 
secured within the anti-communist periphery. In order to redress Europe in the 
economic sense, the Marshall Plan was launched in 1948, briefly after the Truman 
Doctrine, and economic aid was provided to European countries through the 
European Recovery Program, the Economic Cooperation Administration and the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation1. American foreign policy also 
envisaged know-how assistance in the field of labor unions, which could have been 
an ideal means against communism. The records posit that it successfully managed to 
use labor as an anti-communism tool not only in Western Europe but also in Turkey, 
the American exceptionalism in mind, vis-à-vis the communist specter.    
The Cold War era, which turned into a race to win a bastion in Europe and the 
Far East over the other in the specter of communism, envisaged the use of various 
                                                 
1 The European Recovery Program is used interchangeably with the Marshall Plan. Second, the OEEC   
(Organization for European Economic Cooperation) was established on April 16, 1948 by Austuria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Eire, Italy Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. It was designed to oversee the economic revival 
in Europe and closely related with the Marshall Plan. Later, it was replaced by the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1960. As to the ECA (Economic 
Cooperation Administration), it was established in 1948 under the direction of American businessman 
Paul hoffman to carry out American responsibilities related to the European Recovery Program. ECA 
was essentially the Washington office in charge of the Marshall Plan programs. The operating 
agencies in Europe were grouped under the Special Representative of the President in Paris and the 
separate country missions and technical and military assistance was provided to Turkey directly by the 
ECA.   
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means -to reach its ends on the American side through such as political, military, 
technical, social and labor aid. What is striking about the early Cold War era is that 
the United States of America made serious use of labor, which could have easily 
been an ideal nest for communism in Europe and Turkey during the post World War 
II era. Given this imminent threat, the USA made the first move itself before the 
USSR, through the Marshall Plan and later Irving Brown, the representative of the 
American Federation of Labor2 to Europe, in order to get to know Turkish labor 
system and industrials relations; and provided incredible know-how trade-off and 
training assistance to Turkey. Thus, the first building blocks of Turkish labor 
confederation were laid with the help of the American experience in early Cold War 
era as a safeguard against communist type of organization and consequently, mutual 
relations were entrenched strongly on the side of industrial relations, too.    
This thesis by and large elaborates labor in American foreign policy-making 
as of late nineteenth century till 1955 and it is illustrating the influence of American 
labor leaders on the Turkish case in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, which 
included labor component as an extended tool of anti-communism in Europe, 
between 1947 and 1955.  
There are several reasons to write this thesis. First of all, although use of 
labor as part of the Marshall Plan and the assistance provided to various European 
countries have been widely covered by the literature, neither a comprehensive work 
on Turkish industrial relations nor on Turkey and the Marshall Plan has been written 
regarding the USA’s strategic assistance. America’s contribution to Turkish labor 
organization has been generally given place in around one or two pages in a few 
Turkish literature works and there is no single source assigned to mutual labor 
                                                 
2 After the merging of the American Federation of Labor with the CIO in 1955, Irving Brown was 
referred as the representative of the AFL-CIO.   
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relations in American literature. For example, from the perspective of Turkish labor 
unions history, Yıldırım Koç’s book entitled Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Tarihi 
(Turkish Workers’ Class and History of Unionization) covers an era from the 
Ottoman Empires to present time. However, only in two pages, he refers to the red-
scare and closure of labor unions in 1946: 
The territorial demand of the USSR regarding Kars-Ardahan provinces 
(neighboring the Caucuses) initiated the Cold War process in Turkey in late 
1946. Consequently, on 16 December 1946, some labor unions, allegedly 
associated with communists-socialist organizations, were closed down and 
upon the enactment of Law No 5018 on Labor and Employers Unions and 
Union of Labor Unions, the CHP (Republican Peoples’ Party) began to 
emphasize the freedom of association in 1947. Furthermore, the USA tried to 
shape and guide the unionization movement in Turkey.3  
 
Koç, in the section on the establishment of first Turkish confederation, also rejects 
the idea that Irving Brown, ‘a CIA agent’ established the Turkish confederation 
through various visits and training given in the USA to some Turkish unionists.4 The 
logic he uses is the fact that the dismantlement of the CIO and the AFL. However, 
without any help of the CIO, the AFL European representative, Brown successfully 
carried out his activities in various continents.  
 Another important source regarding the early relations between Turkish 
American labor unions is the one covering interviews made by Dr Kenan Öztürk 
with Irving Brown in June and July 1988 shortly before his death. The book gives 
only the script of seven interview tapes and does not bring a discussion to the matter. 
Only in his two page long introduction part, does he mention that: 
When the history of the unionization after World War II is analyzed, 
you will see that the mostly mentioned figure is Irving Brown. Brown 
conducted American Cold War strategy in all European countries and 
                                                 
3 Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Tarihi (Turkish Workers’ Class and History of 
Unionization) (İstanbul: Analiz Basım, 2003),  80-81. 
4 Ibid, 89.  
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in many African and Asian countries and in this regard, he was the 
first person in charge. 5 
 
Öztürk’s book contains the interviews with Irving Brown and he has been 
very cooperative. 6  In the first part of his dissertation, he mentions briefly the 
American labor strategy during Cold War and international labor organizations. That 
is why; in this thesis, various references have been made to his dissertation.  
Nonetheless, like other works in the literature, he fails to give comprehensive details 
regarding the involvement of Irving Brown and rather than American foreign policy 
perspective, he focuses on the Turkish experience.  
The books written by Yüksel Işık (Türk Solu ve Sendikal Hareket) 7  and 
Kemal Sülker (Türkiye Sendikacılık Tarihi)8 are mainly on freedom of association 
developments, rise of local labor unions and the establishment of Türk-İş 
confederation. However, in the related sections on the establishment of 
confederations, neither Işık nor Sülker mention Irving Brown, his contribution, 
America’s aid as part of Cold War strategy. 
When the non-Turkish sources are browsed written on the Marshall Plan and 
Labor unions, there is no reference made to Irving Brown’s visit to Turkey except the 
sources at the George Meany Archives. However, they generally focus on freedom of 
association and labor unions in Britain, Italy and Greece.    
 To sum up so far, the literature lacks a work solely focusing on labor as part 
of American foreign policy and American labor unions’ assistance to Turkey during 
early Cold War. Only a few Turkish sources do make limited references and these do 
                                                 
5 Kenan Öztürk, Amerikan Sendikacılığı ve Türkiye: İlk İlişkiler, AFL-CIO’nun Avrupa Temsilcisiyle 
Söyleşi. (American Unionization and Turkey: Early Relations, Interview with the European 
Representative of the AFL-CIO) (İstanbul: Tüstav, 2004).  
6 I am very grateful to Kenan Öztürk for he transferred his typewritten Ph.D. dissertation into a CD 
and sent it to me.  
7 Yüksel Işık, Türk Solu ve Sendikal Hareket(Turkish Left and Unionist Movement) (Ankara: Öteki 
Yayınevi, 1995). 
8 Kemal Sülker, Türkiye Sendikacılık Tarihi (History of Turkish Labor Unions) (İstanbul: Tüstav, 
2004). 
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not discuss the issue, as part of Turkish American foreign policies within the 
framework of anti-communism. Nevertheless, none of these works comprehensively 
elaborate the role labor played in American foreign policy. Hence, this thesis will fill 
an important gap in the literature and shed light on the barely discovered arm of the 
Marshall Plan’s social assistance to Turkey regarding the labor unions.   
The code of underpinnings for the Cold War became a monolithic and a 
conceptual one under the name of Marshall Plan, initially covering military, 
economic and technical aid, yet coming to include social aid in the field of labor 
relations. The Marshall Plan became the modus operandi or road map document for 
American foreign policy. As of early summer 1947, while the world was becoming a 
chessboard to be ruled over and the countries were turning into bastions to be 
secured between America and the USSR, the former had to make its move earlier 
than the latter to get another bastion, which was fragile and threatened by the USSR. 
To put it another way, America had to protect the geographically furthest outpost of 
the democratic West: Turkey. Hence, the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and the 
Marshall Plan of July 1947 was devised to protect the allies and provide military and 
economic aid.    
Since the Marshall Plan and its four sub-components relating Turkey namely 
economic, military, technical and social aid, have been poorly discovered and 
insufficiently written in the literature, the purpose of this thesis here is to elaborate 
the American aid to Turkish industrial relations and labor unions during Cold War, 
after providing a comprehensive perspective regarding the role of labor in foreign 
policy making of the USA from late 19th century till 1955.    
Hence, this thesis is not about the history of Turkish American labor unions 
but rather how America rendered industrial relations an intrinsic Cold War value as 
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part of its foreign policy making, in the specter of communism, by putting the 
emphasis on Turkish case. The thesis shall use both descriptive and comparative 
history methods together. The descriptive method will be implemented in explaining 
the chronology of events and background of significant unionist leaders between the 
1870s and 1940s while the comparative method will be used to compare Turkish 
labor system to the American labor system, as of the second half of the thesis. Thus, 
this thesis shall be structured as such: First, in Chapter II, after providing historic 
account of labor in American foreign policy and American exceptionalism, the 
internationalization of labor in the world and its place in US foreign policy, the need 
for the creation of the Marshall Plan, its inclusion of labor and American anti-
communist plan of action in the field of labor, in various European countries shall be 
discussed.   
While touching upon these issues, it will be seen that one figure, Irving 
Brown, became important, who was the representative of the American Federation of 
Labor to Europe as of 1945 and given the charge of pursuing American labor foreign 
policy in Germany, France, Britain and Italy between 1944 and 1947 by making use 
of the CIA funds and in Eastern Europe (Greece and Turkey), the Middle East and 
Africa after 1947 by using the Marshall funds. So, this chapter shall illustrate how 
labor became a foreign policy-making tool over the course of the history of the USA.     
Chapter III shall base upon the Turkish case, first encounter of both countries 
in the field of industrial relations, visits of American trade unionists to Turkish labor 
unions, the training program offered by the US government for two-month period 
and the impression of Turkish unionists, expected to structure country’s first 
confederation. 
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 Irving Brown and his mission paid several visits to İstanbul and İzmir9 on 
various occasions in 1951, to have meetings with Turkish employers and workers in 
order to design Turkish industrial relations10 in line with the European ones recently 
redesigned with the help of the USA. Hence, a training program was agreed with the 
Democrat Party government and the USA. Within this framework, almost 600 
Turkish workers were sent to 2 month-training programs in the USA. Some of them 
stayed three months. The training covered visits to many industrialized American 
cities such as Pittsburg, Chicago, New Jersey, and Los Angeles. The trained Turkish 
unionists returned to Turkey to establish first labor confederation of the country. In 
order to illustrate all details and aspects of Turkish American cooperation in the field 
of industrial relations, documents obtained from the U.S. Embassy to Ankara, the 
George Meany Archives in Maryland/U.S.A 11 , Turkish dailies archives at the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly; interviews with Irving Brown in Paris in 198912 
and Yıldırım Koç in Ankara in 2005 and 2006 shall be used.13    
Finally, the thesis will have achieved to show that the United States of 
America, bearing American exceptionalism, based on liberalism, individualism and 
capitalism, and uniqueness of its own industrial relations with long past in mind 
managed to contribute to the foundation of a Turkish confederation upon the anti-
                                                 
9 See Pictures of his visits to Turkey in Annex I. 
10 Turkish industrial relations were not organized under the umbrella of a confederation before. Thus, 
this was a great opportunity foreseen by American unionists earlier than the Russians to be well 
evaluated.    
11 Now that Irving Brown contributed to the establishment of Türk-İş, I expected that there would be 
many primary sources regarding that era at the Türk-İş Archives. However, a person who wanted to 
kept anonymous said that some of the documents got moldy and thrown away or during the military 
coup d’états of 27 May 1960, 12 March 1970 and 12 September 1980, the documents belonging to the 
establishment of Türk-İş were burnt. For this reason, as a researcher, I was lucky to have found related 
documents around 60 pages at the George Meany Archives regarding that era. Yet, it is also sad not to 
have original copies, which would be shedding light to a transformative time of Turkey.    
12 Seven interviews were carried out with Irving Brown in Paris in June and July 1988 by Dr Kenan 
Öztürk. The book is the manuscript of the seven interview tapes.  
13 My continuous efforts to find the unionists who had been to training programs in the USA for two 
month-periods were useless. The Retired Unionists Association in Ankara did not have a list of them 
or the ones I was able to reach were too young to remember 
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communist ideals of the democratic world and that America efficiently made 
systematic use of labor during early Cold War era as it had never done before.     
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND LABOR: 1860-1945 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
American foreign policy was early based on mercantilism and commercialism. 
Before establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Far-Eastern countries and 
Europe, commercial ties were strengthened in first place. Over time, as of the 1860s, 
America began to produce more than the domestic demands. As a corollary, the crisis 
of 1893-1897 occurred on account of fundamental structural problems such as 
overbuilt economy and an inadequate market for goods. Thus, the country would 
either cut down on production or had to find new markets to sell and boost profit in 
order to keep or increase the number of jobs. In other words, this connoted increase 
of welfare and in a way more job availability for workers, the numbers of whom 
were nurtured with new flux of migrations from Europe. As Republican Senator 
Albert J. Bridge of Indiana put it, “we are raising more than we can 
consume….making more than we can use. Therefore, we must find new markets for 
our produce, new occupation for our capital, new work for our labor.”14 
Hence, the country had to revise its foreign policy and determine a global 
strategy, including new targets. In May 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner, 
who read his famous essay at Chicago Fair, entitled “The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History” reminded Americans that the continent had now been settled. 
                                                 
14 John Mack Faragher et al., Out of Many. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 616.  
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Having passed “from the task of filling up the vacant spaces of the continent”, the 
nation is now “thrown back upon itself.” 15  This meant that America needed to 
determine a new “frontier” to circulate its input and output and in so doing to sustain 
its economic system and welfare.  
Especially, during late 19th century, U.S. foreign policy became more and 
more an interest seeking one. 16 With this end, the geographic periphery had to be 
secured through interventions into Cuba, Haiti, Hawaii, the Philippines, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Chile. Thus, America’s 
economic interests were ensured by recognition of ‘no visible frontiers’ outside the 
U.S.A., which constituted a new geostrategy for it. As it was proved at the Chicago 
Technology Fair of May 1893, America was turning into a hi-tech giant of the world 
and new empire of the world following the Spanish-American War of 1898.   
In this course, the contribution of labor unions and workers is undeniable. 
Influence of labor in American foreign policy can be separated into four major 
periods, which is the subject matter of this chapter: late 19th century marked by 
awakening and organization of working class; early 20th century U.S. foreign policy 
marked by labor radicalism in domestic policy; wartime consensus during 1939-1945 
and agreement between government, unions and business sector, turning into 
tripartite solidarity, to be carried over to the post-war era; and last, anticommunism 
during post-1945.      
First of all, during late 19th century, it will be seen that parallel to the 
industrialization, a working class came into being and forged to be unionized. 
Various craftsmen guilds, unions were incrementally put under federations; this or 
that way, they supported foreign policy or opposed. Yet, one thing was obvious that 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 616. 
16 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1987).  
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labor started to play an important role in American foreign policy. Secondly, 
between 1890s and 1920s, the U.S. also witnessed the rise of labor radicalism, 
resulting in red-baiting especially during the term of President Woodrow Wilson. 
Some labor unions, sympathizing with socialism and Stalin had to make a decision. 
This period can be defined as the adolescence period, during which the unions were 
trying to establish their real identity. With this end, specific emphasis shall be put on 
President Woodrow Wilson era and Socialist Party.  
Thirdly, another purpose of this part is also to illustrate that red-bait and anti-
communism did not start solely after 1945 yet way before during early 20th century. 
The third phase of the labor and foreign policy is the World War II era, marked by 
solidarity between government, unions and business sector, urged by wartime 
mobilization. The fourth phase is initiated with the emergence of Cold War, which is 
the main setting and period for this thesis and Turkish case study.  All these four 
phases were marked by one concept; American exceptionalism. According to the 
unions, as this was the case with the identity of Americans, they also held that 
American labor organization system was unique and had to be transposed to other 
countries in order to secure welfare of their own citizens.   
 
 
2.2 Overview of American Exceptionalism 
 
American exceptionalism or character stems from the American Revolution, 
based on antistatism, populism, egalitarianism, self-realization, liberal laissez-faire 
and individualism. Parallel to the building economic prosperity and the Open Door 
policy in late 19th century, America was forged to be the empire of the world; it did 
not emerge as an Empire in early 21st century, contrary to the common conviction 
today. Being an empire meant to have power, more and more mills turning, thereby 
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leading to the construction of an unchallenged huge political and economic system, 
the hands of which were almost everywhere. Undeniably, America followed a 
foreign policy based on commercialism and national interests. It intervened in Latin 
America and Far East as of late 19th century and got more and more involved in 
Europe during the World War I and II, to secure their economic interests, as a 
priority in foreign policy.  
All these achievements were made possible thanks to American character. 
Between the 1860s and 1945, the journey of American unionization illustrates the 
reflection of this character. This observation is also the answer to why socialism 
could not survive in the U.S.A; because socialism was contradicting tenets of 
capitalism such as individualism, liberalism, self-realization, populism and 
antistatism. Post-World War II period is also marked by American exceptionalism. 
Basing on this feature, America felt an urge to redress Europe by providing 
economic assistance and by trading off its values to make the Democratic world 
more viable and to create a strong interlocutor in its commercial and political 
relations.  
With these in mind, the USA created an aid plan, based on both political and 
economic interests. The edifice of a new Europe meant a viable economic 
counterpart for the USA while these countries would also remain in the sphere of 
American influence. In economic sense, the countries, which were able to smartly 
make use of it, benefited a lot to redress their economies; for those which could not 
do efficiently like Turkey, became more and more dependent on the USA. In either 
way, America had the best out of it. Before implementing the plan, the U.S. made 
efficient use of labor unions to win the working segments of these societies.  
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In the aftermath of the war, the fact that the Cold War emerged between the 
USA and the USSR made it necessary for America to redesign the labor movements 
in Europe and the Middle East in American way before the communist type of 
unionism became influential. With this aim, major activist of the American 
Federation of Labor, Irving Brown was charged with the duty of disseminating 
American way of union organization and the know-how through trainings and 
meetings with the unions and national authorities in Germany, France, Britain, Italy, 
Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Egypt, Korea and Iran. With vivid examples, the reader 
will be amazed by this lucid plan of action, which is inspired by the American 
exceptionalism regarding the American way superior to the communist one. Before 
moving onto the onset of the Cold War, it will be beneficial at first to have a closer 
look to the psychology, hard-work, history and the development of freedom of 
association of labor, turning into an important foreign policy actor.      
 
 
2.3 American Labor and Foreign Policy: From Open Door to Cold War 
 
  Through industrialization, American search for order was completed in the 
continent; the domestic markets were entrenched and created a working class by 
1900. The technological advancements, a wide web of railroads and innovations in 
the country made it superior to European countries in terms of economy. In that, as 
of the 1860s, when America started to produce more than the demand for goods in 
the market, it had to seek markets abroad. Industrial production based on 
consumption would either stop or would expand to other countries. As Senator of 
Alabama John T. Morgan warned in 1882: 
Our home market is not equal to the demands of our producing and 
manufacturing classes and to the capital which is seeking 
 14
employment…We must either enlarge the field or our traffic or stop 
the business of manufacturing just where it is.17 
 
 Later, during the depression of the 1890s, Secretary of State Walter Gresham 
worried that the U.S. enterprises could not afford constant employment. 18  He 
proposed that the government act immediately “to enable Americans to compete in 
foreign markets with Great Britain.”19   
Organized labor, business and the governing elite in the United States have 
traditionally seen the third world as a source of raw materials useful in U.S. 
enterprises and as a market for goods produced by U.S. workers. Overseas 
investments were also regarded necessary to absorb the excess capital produced by 
businesses in the United States.20 
Without doubt, the Open Door policy enabled American expansion of 
corporate and political influence and U.S. unionists highly benefited from this policy 
because expansionism meant more mills running and new jobs were created. Foreign 
investments created profits that returned to the country, were invested in new 
domestic enterprises and helped maintain salaries and other benefits for workers. 
Raw materials obtained from foreign and overseas markets were the ingredients of a 
thriving U.S. manufacturing sector.21 Higher wages, benefits, salaries ensured job 
security, and laborers were able to enjoy national welfare. These were the payoffs for 
American workers, obtained through investments made in foreign markets and flow 
of natural resources.  
 
                                                 
17 Llyod C. Gardner, Imperial America: American Foreign Policy Since 1898 (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1976), 17. 
18 Beth Sims, Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor’s Role in US Foreign Policy, 
(Boston: South End Press, 1992), 7. 
19 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire, (Ithaca: NY, Cornell University Press 1963), 200. 
20 Sims, 6.  
21 Ibid., 7.   
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2.3.1. Unionization Movement and Major Labor Unions in the U.S.A Between 
the 1860s and 1945.  
To begin with early labor unions’ organization movement, it first started in 
the Gilded Age, which witnessed territorial, economic, industrial and demographic 
expansion between 1865 and 1901. First worker groups to get organized were 
railroad workers, locomotive firemen, and steel workers. The grouping of labor 
unions was based on wage-earning and the type of craft. General aim of early unions 
was to provide decent working conditions and hours in first place and in time, such 
organizations began to voice the demands of the workers.   
  At this stage, it is a must to briefly touch upon the significant labor union 
organizations, which were major actors in the field of labor. The first national labor 
federation of America was the National Labor Union, founded in 1866 and dissolved 
in 1872 and it is the core of the movement which paved the way for other 
organizations, such as the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor. 
In December 1869, the Knights of Labor union was founded by a group of 
Philadelphia tailors led by Uriah S. Stephens. The Knights grouped workers by 
industry, regardless of trade or skill or gender. Until the establishment of the 
American Federation of Labor in 1886, the Knights of Labor was the most active 
labor union. For the first time, a labor union organized nationwide campaigns for the 
following purposes-sometimes reaching an anarchist extent such as Hay Market 
Riot-22 and achieved these objectives to a large extent: shortening the hours of labor 
                                                 
22 On 1 May 1886, labor unions organized a strike for an eight-hour work day in Chicago, under the 
leadership of the Knights of Labor leading 80,000 people down Michigan Avenue, as the first May 
Day Parade. In the next few days, 350,000 workers nationwide joined the parade and went on strike at 
1,200 factories. Though the causes of the incident are still unknown, the police killed two workers and 
wounded several during a skirmish and a couple of days later, on account of rage growing in Chicago, 
a bomb attack took place against the police by the workers, resulting in death of 8 police officers. On 
November 11, 1887, August Spies, Albert Parsons, Adolph Fischer, and George Engel, convicted by 
court, were hanged together in front of a public audience. This event cause the rejection of May Day 
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to an eight-hour day, ending the use of child labor, equal pay for equal work among 
the genders; the use of arbitration rather than strikes; the promotion of cooperative 
businesses. Knights had a reputation for being all-inclusive since it accepted women, 
blacks (after 1883), and employers as members.   
In 1886, the American Federation of Labor was established in Columbus, 
Ohio by Samuel Gompers-president until his death in 1924- as an umbrella 
federation for craft unions in the U.S and the Knights of Labor lost its members to 
the AFL, from 1886 onwards. 23  On December 1, 1873, the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen was founded at Port Jervis, New York and the members were 
the skilled railroad workers. Initially, insurance benefits were the main incentive for 
membership, but by the late nineteenth century, the Brotherhood merged with the 
American Railway Union, established on June 20, 1893 and became more 
specialized in unionization.     
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, another significant labor 
union, was established in 1900 in New York City. In  June 1905, the International 
Workers of the World was founded in Chicago at a convention where  two hundred 
socialists, anarchists, and radical trade unionists from all over the United States 
(mainly the Western Federation of Miners) joined and objected to the policies of the 
American Federation of Labor. 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a federation of unions that 
organized industrial workers in the United States and Canada, especially between 
1935 and 1955. On account of presence of leftist unionists within itself, to some 
extent it lacked the support of the governments until 1955, which will be elaborated 
                                                                                                                                          
as the Labor Day since it reminded of this radical movement and instead, every first Monday of 
September became the Labor Day, which is a federal holiday.     
23 Craft unionism means organization of workers in a specific industry according to particular craft or 
trade that they work in. It contrasts with industrial unionism, in which all workers in the same industry 
are organized into the same union, regardless of differences in skill. 
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in the Cold War relations part of this chapter. In 1955, the CIO merged with the AFL 
to constitute the AFL-CIO. In May 1935, the United Automobile Workers was 
founded in Detroit, Michigan as a reaction to the AFL policies and became an 
integral part of the CIO. Out of this many labor unions, only the AFL and the CIO 
were the most influential spokesmen of the workers during late 19th century and early 
20th century.   
 
Table 1.  Major American labor unions and confederations  
Name of the labor 
union/Federation 
Date & Place Characteristics 
National Labor Union (NLU) in 1866 and dissolving in 1872 first national labor federation in 
the U.S.A. Set example to the 
Knight of Labor and the 
American Federation of Labor 
Knights of Labor December 1869-190l; Chicago founded in secrecy in December 
1869, by a group of 
Philadelphia tailors led by 
Uriah S. Stephens. The Knights 
grouped workers by industry, 
regardless of trade or craft; 
totally dissolved in 1900 since 
members left it for the AFL as 
of 1886.  
 
Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen  (BLF) 
 
American Railway Union  
December 1, 1873; Port Jervis,  
 
 
New York June 20, 1893 
 
 
 
Dissolved in 1897 
American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) 
Columbus, Ohio in 1886 by 
Samuel Gompers  
Founded mainly by craft unions 
International Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union 
(ILGWU) 
 1900;  New York City Merged with Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union in 1995 to form the 
Union of Needle-trades, 
Industrial and Textile 
Employees (UNITE) 
International Workers of the 
World (IWW) 
June 1905; Chicago, 
headquarters in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, USA 
Had two hundred socialists, 
anarchists, and radical trade 
unionists from all over the 
United States (mainly the 
Western Federation of Miners) 
opposing to the policies of the 
American Federation of Labor 
United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) 
May 1935; Detroit, Michigan Governed under the CIO till 
1946 by John L. Lewis; Walter 
Reuther elected president in 
1947 till 1970 
Congress of Industrial 1935-1955l; Chicago A federation of unions that 
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Organizations (CIO)  organized industrial workers in 
the United States and Canada; 
merged with the AFL in 1955. 
United Steelworkers of America 
(USW) 
May 22, 1942; Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania; founder Philip 
Murray  
represents workers from the 
U.S. and Canada and workers 
from sectors such as metals, 
chemicals, glass, rubber, tires, 
transportation, utilities, 
container industries, 
pharmaceuticals and health 
care. 
 
 
2.3.2. Rise of Labor Radicalism, Red-Scare and Red-Baiting, 1900-1930  
The United States is regarded as an exceptional country, uniquely different 
from the traditional societies of the Old World. The term “American exceptionalism”, 
which underscores this difference, was widely discussed after World War I to search 
for the weakness of working-class radicalism in the United States. Furthermore, the 
exceptionalism issue gave rise to debates at the Comintern bodies in the 1920s, 
especially between Joseph Stalin and Jay Lovestone, the secretaries of the Soviet 
communist party and American socialist parties. 24  Although there was not a 
communist movement as strong as in the case of Russia, the emergence of the left 
movement at the heart of capitalist United States was unusual and the movement, 
which had its ups and downs, was doomed to fail. Nonetheless, it was on the rise on 
the eve of World War I and in the aftermath of World War II. What is significant 
about the left movement against Wilson’s decision of American involvement into 
World War I is that it led to the “Red Scare” and anti-communist psychology for the 
first time, in the country before the inception of the Cold War in 1945. Thus, the aim 
of this section is to analyze the influence of American Left movement on America 
and emergence of Red Scare during the 1910s and 1920s.  
                                                 
24  Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Did Not Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the 
United States (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 2000), 15 
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This section will illustrate why socialism could not survive in the USA and 
how the rise of the Left Movement, its inspiration by the Bolsheviks and its efforts to 
prevent conscription for World War I caused majority of public opinion to react 
against the Bolsheviks harshly in that American political will did not recognize the 
new government in Russia, coming to power in 1917. 25 
Rise of radical labor movement in the USA coincides with President 
Woodrow Wilson’s term of office and his foreign policy especially concerning entry 
into World War I was highly challenged by the rising American Left while 
communism was gradually settling in power in Russia around late 1917. Though at 
the beginning, Wilson was inclined to remain neutral, upon the Zimmerman telegram 
and the increasing attacks towards American commercial ships, he decided to join 
the war in 1917. However, the American Leftists and leftist citizens, mostly from the 
working class of German, Scandinavian, Jewish and Eastern European immigrants 
robustly opposed American involvement since this would negatively affect the 
workers and it would not be appropriate to fight against their worker brothers in 
Germany. The Left movement, which illustrates how foreign and domestic policies 
are mutually inclusive, was not a phenomenon emerging all of a sudden on the eve of 
World War I, neither did the Red Scare psychology begin in 1945. As a corollary, the 
events of radical socialist movement developing among the labor unions in early 20th 
century created a communist scare and a protective psychology on the government’s 
side.  
As of late 19th century through the 1930s, working class and class 
consciousness was forged and highly influenced by Marx and socialism in Russia 
though it did not form into large scale socialism in America. Engels, Sombart, Marx, 
                                                 
25 The USSR was recognized by F. D. Roosevelt in 1933.  
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Wells and many other sociologists or political theorists anticipated the establishment 
of a strong socialist movement or a viable left-wing working class party now that 
America was a leading industrial country. However, socialism could not grow deep 
roots and failed because socialism or fraternity of the proletariat was against the 
unique American character stemming from the Revolution, based on antistatism, 
populism, egalitarianism, self-realization, liberal laissez-faire and individualism. 
 Furthermore, America did not have a long established caste or class system, 
or peasantry as in Russia or in Europe. For instance, after Marx’s death, Engels 
recognized that socialist movements were not emerging on a mass scale in the United 
States and attributed political backwardness of American workers to the absence of a 
feudal past.26 As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out, “the aristocratic element had 
been feeble from America’s birth” and the traditional patterns of family and 
corporate authority of the Old World never managed to achieve any vigor in the New 
World.27 America developed on a totally bourgeois basis. Social classes took course 
according to income level or to level of participation into national economy. Workers 
always had a chance to climb the ladders of the middle class. Nonetheless, socialism 
tried its chance twice: first, before America’s entry into World War I under the 
leadership of Eugene Debs leading to the Red Scare, which shall be the subject 
matter of this section, and second, after World War II, which will be elaborated at the 
end of this chapter. 
First of all, the reasons lying behind Wilson’s decision regarding American 
involvement in the war, which caused the rise of the dormant Left movement, should 
be elaborated. It was Woodrow Wilson’s fate to be the first U.S president to face the 
full blast of twentieth century revolutions. His responses made his policies the most 
                                                 
26 Lipset, 21. 
27  Jack Greene, “The American Revolution and Modern Revolutions.” in Understanding the 
American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 383. 
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influential in twentieth century American foreign policy. “Wilsonian” became a term 
to describe later policies highlighting internationalism and moralism, aiming to 
extend democracy.28  
At the beginning, Wilson was against entering into war. However, a prewar 
suspicion of German militarism and autocratic government and the accounts of 
“uncivilized” German warfare influenced Wilson and many Americans to believe 
that the United States faced an evil world force and that in going to war with 
Germany, the nation would be striking a blow for liberty and democracy. 29 
Furthermore, there was an increasing anti-war psychology from the ranks of 
immigrants and the socialists. Although in an economic sense America was not 
neutral, politically, Wilson took up active opposition to war to win reelection in 1916. 
In his presidential campaign, Democrats adopted the winning slogan “He Kept Us 
Out of War” in order to draw hundreds of thousands of votes away from the anti-war 
Socialist Party.30 Yet, pretty soon, Wilson was to change his foreign policy and be 
challenged severely. 
Cultural, political and economic factors had already made the impartiality of 
Wilson impossible. War time trade between the USA, France and Britain boomed 
and America was making $3.2 billion in 1916 as opposed to $824 million in 1914, 
while loans to the Allies exceeded $2.5 billion and to the Central Powers only $27 
million, by 1917.31 Thus, America was already indirectly partial in an economic 
sense. The interception of the Zimmerman telegram in 1917 and German U-boat 
attacks to American commercial ships and Ally ships carrying American passengers 
                                                 
28 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1994), 269-270).   
29 Ross Gregory, “Rights, Honor and Interests.” in Major Problems in American Foreign Policy. 
Volume II: Since 1914 (Massachusetts: D.C Heath and Co., 1989), 58. 
30 August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson: Biography (New York: MacMillan Co., 1991), 
 263 and Faragher et al., 675. 
31  Faragher et al, 673-4. 
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between 1915 and 1916 just eased the process of American involvement into the war. 
The telegram was suggesting Mexico to take up arms against the US and receive in 
return the lost territory in New Mexico, Arizona and Texas:  
It is our purpose on the 1st of February to commence the unrestricted 
U-boat war. The attempt will be made to keep America neutral in spite 
of all. In case, we should not be successful in this, we propose Mexico 
alliance upon following terms: Joint conduct of the war, joint 
conclusion of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our 
part that Mexico shall gain back by conquest the territory lost by her 
at a prior period in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Arrangement as 
to details is entrusted to you Excellency.32 
 
As it can be seen, in 1917, America was regarded by Germany as supporter of 
the Allies. In response, America broke diplomatic relations with Germany on 
February 1917 and President Wilson addressed the Congress immediately for 
permission to wage war against Germany:  
It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful nation into war, into the 
most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to 
be in the balance…We shall fight for things which we have always 
carried nearest our hearts, -for democracy…for the rights and liberties 
of small nations…to make the world itself last free. To such a task, we 
can dedicate our lives and fortunes, everything that were are and 
everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the 
day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her 
might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the 
peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.33  
 
In his address, Wilson was expressing America’s willingness to restore peace 
and balance of power in the world. The disclosure of the Zimmerman Telegram and 
President’s address simultaneously caused both widespread pro-war and anti-war 
sensations in the society. On the one hand, anti-German feelings emerged and 
thousands of people, who had cultural ties with Britain and France joined pro-war 
                                                 
32  The Zimmerman Telegram  in Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Volume II since 1914  
(Massachusetts: D.C Heath and Co., 1989), 50. 
33 An Address to a Joint Session of Congress. 2 April 1917, 8.30 p.m. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 
Volume 41, January 24-April 6, 1917 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 526-27. 
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demonstrations in New York, Boston and many other cities. Most newspapers, 
religious leaders, state legislatures, and prominent public figures supported the call to 
arms. However, Wilson was concerned about the reactions of ordinary people to 
fight in Europe. He engaged into war mobilization to unify the country and with this 
end, he established the Committee on Public Information to organize public opinion 
for universal military draft, as America was delayed entering the war due to lack of a 
concerted draft policy. For instance, Senator Paul Oscar Husting’s letter to the 
President, dated April 27, 1917, was expressing this concern:  
I had the honor of discussing with you the question of the advisability 
of raising troops by conscription or volunteering…It is plain from the 
statements of Senator Chamberlain and other that no soldiers can be 
put under conscription until about August 1. This means we shall lose 
the months of May, June and July when time seems to me to be of the 
very essence. 34 
 
On the one hand, the anti-war senators and the Leftists were trying to delay 
conscription by organizing anti-draft demonstrations and distributing flyers. On the 
other hand, Wilson was enforcing the National War Labor Board to regulate labor 
force not to disrupt production and to arbitrate labor disputes or strikes. Samuel 
Gompers, pro-war head of the American Federation of Labors (AFL), provided a 
patriotic support while the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies) 
denounced capitalism as a system based on exploitation, and opposed US entry into 
the war. IWW leaders advised their members to refuse induction for the “capitalists’ 
war”.35 So, Wilson held that the IWW was a subversive organization and a threat to 
national security. 36 Moreover, in farm communities and in urban working class 
neighborhoods, opposition to war was so widespread that in 1917 the White House 
                                                 
34 From Paul Oscar Huntin to President Woodrow Wilson. Washinton D.C April 27, 1917).The Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson. Volume 42, April 7-June 23, 1917 (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 
1983), 146. 
35 Faragher et al, 682. 
36 Ibid., 666-667. 
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provided the initial funding for Samuel Gompers’ pro-war Alliance for Labor and 
Democracy. 37  Wilson charged Samuel Gompers, head of the AFL, to chair the 
Nation War Labor Board in April 1918. By the same token, the IWW grew in the 
West in 1916 and 1917 and gained strength among workers in domains vital to war 
such as copper mining, lumbering and wheat harvesting. Upon strike organization 
efforts of the IWW in Bisbee and many other places, the Justice Department agents 
organized raids against them and arrested hundreds of activists, ultimately leading to 
the beginning of a powerful wave of political repression.38  
With some exceptions and defections, the American Left strongly opposed 
World War I and Wilson’s foreign policy, “as a capitalistic, imperialistic power that 
was fighting in the name of superannuated nationalism.”39 Nonetheless, America’s 
entry into war led to dissidence in the American Left between the ones who believed 
after all that England was preferable to “feudal” Germany and those who could see 
no difference to the working class between one oppressor or another. Finally, some 
socialists like William Walling, Upton Sinclair and A.M Simons left the Socialist 
position to support Woodrow Wilson.40 Yet, the majority of the Left held that it 
would be murder to fight against their proletariat brothers and all workers in the 
world were comrades. Debs voiced this concern in a militant way in his Canton, 
Ohio speech on June 16, 1918, and stated that “the master class has always declared 
wars; the subject class had always fought the battles”41 while American socialists’ 
“hearts were with the Bolsheviki of Russia for their incomparable valor and sacrifice 
                                                 
37  Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist, Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois, 
1982), 281. 
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added luster to the fame of the international movement.”42 The international working 
class had everything to lose and nothing to gain from this war exercised in greed and 
violence. This conviction was clearly stated at War Proclamation and Program 
Adopted at National Convention by the Socialist Party at St. Louis during the 
Convention on April 1917.   
Modern wars as a rule have been caused by the commercial and 
financial rivalry and intrigues of capitalist interests in the different 
countries. Whether they have been frankly waged as wars of 
aggression or have been hypocritically represented as wars of defense, 
they have always been made by the classes and fought by the 
masses…Our entrance into the European War was instigated by the 
predatory capitalists in the United States who boast of the enormous 
profit of $7,000,000,000 from the manufacture and sale of munitions 
and war supplies and from the exportation of American food stuffs 
and other necessaries…The war of the United States against Germany 
cannot be justified even on the plea that it is a war in defense of 
American rights or American “honor.” …The danger of recurrence of 
was will exist as long as the capitalist system of industry remains in 
existence.43 
 
According to the American socialists’ rhetoric, millions of workers would die, 
millions would be hurt and the outcome would retard the social and political 
liberation of oppressed classes all over the world.44 With this end, the Socialist Party 
engaged anti-draft campaigns. Flyers and pamphlets were distributed and 
demonstrations were organized. To illustrate, the below cited flyer circulated by 
anonymous anarchists appealed to the individual’s conscience to refuse induction 
into the military: 
You are against murder and bloodshed; you have no special 
grievances against the working class of Germany. All you ask for is to 
get along peacefully, express yourself, make a living and take care of 
your family. You do not want war and you did not ask the president or 
any one else to declare war. But you will ask: What can I do if I am 
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drafted and ordered to fight?...You would probably be killed and your 
family would suffer…You have a mind and a conscience and you 
believe in brotherhood and real democracy. If you think murder is 
wrong, REFUSE TO JOIN THE ARMY or any military body…No 
matter what the government of other fellows does, let us you and I be 
faithful to mankind and REFUSE TO GO TO WAR.45  
 
 Such seditious flyers and pamphlets frustrated Wilson; however, he had to 
wait for the aftermath of the war to punish such seditious activities. His primary 
objective was first to unite the Americans around a single cause: entry into war. On 
the other hand, the anti-war Leftist movement had so much appeal among the 
working class and towns, cities inhabited by especially immigrants that Eugene Debs 
ranked in third place at the presidential elections of 1904 (402,283 votes), 1908 
(420,793 votes), 1912 (900,672 votes) and 1920 (919,799 votes). As it can be seen, 
his votes increased in 1912 and 1920 in a dramatic way parallel to the rise of labor 
radicalism circa World War I. Debs was regarded among three men in America, who 
had a special persona beside Wilson and Roosevelt.46 There was a growing anti-war 
opinion among immigrants, who constituted one-third out of 92 million population 
and endorsed the Left Movement. Strong support for the Central Powers was found 
among the eight million German Americans in the Mid-West and South as well as 
the four million Irish Americans, who shared their ancestral homeland’s historical 
hatred of English rule.47   
The socialist party made its biggest gains during the war in its strongest urban 
center, Milwaukee. The party won some electoral offices in the city as of 1904, 
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including state legislature and municipalities. 48  Germans in Milwaukee, 
Scandinavians in Minneapolis; Jews, Germans and Irish in New York were 
antagonistic to American involvement on the side of the Allies.49 Henry Morgenthau, 
who was a former U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between 1913 and1916 
and called back to the U.S. because of war, expressed his deep concerns about the 
past antiwar stance in New York as it follows in his letter to the President on 
November 26, 1917: 
The growing anti-war sentiment in New York should be fought as 
vigorously as possible. I addressed great many large and small 
meetings and mixed with Democrats, Independents and Socialists. I 
was greatly discouraged at the amount of outright opposition and the 
tremendous indifference to the war as well as the lack of enthusiasm 
among the mass of those who are supporting the war.50 
 
Thus, it was hard for the government to convince public opinion. In all these 
communities, the Socialist Party had close relationships with many ethnic-linked 
unions whereas support to the Party fell in smaller and rural communities where 
social pressure could be more coercive.51 Moreover, the American “participation into 
the World War I had a beneficial effect on trade unions, In the course of the war, the 
membership of the American Federation of Labor doubled and the government 
recognized the impossibility of winning the war without an effective mobilization of 
the labor forces.”52 As far as general dissidence was concerned, the Socialist Party 
became an anti-war platform of the pacifists and socialist working class.  
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Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 became influential in 
American involvement in the war and Red-baiting at home. After the Bolshevik 
Revolution took place in Russia, radicals around the world drew inspiration from the 
first successful revolution against a capitalist state.53 Likewise, American socialist 
rhetoric was abundant in expression of such an inspiration, too:  
The kind of a revolution we need first is a revolution in the minds of 
men and women. Economic development always makes physical 
conditions ripe for a change long before the brains of human being 
catch up with the process. From what we know, we could sweep away 
capitalism tomorrow if the working people were mentally prepared to 
do it. We all hope for the best in Russia. The unit of the new society 
will be not the municipal council, not the political cabinet, not even 
the Socialist party branch, but the labor union. 54 
 
The statement illustrates that revolution would be possible in America 
through an economic revolution followed a political one basing on labor unions.  
 Although sympathetic to the March Revolution overthrowing czar, President 
Wilson refused to recognize the authority of the Bolshevik regime when he received 
reports of the ferocity of the civil war in Russia.55 For instance, Samuel Reading 
Bertorn’s letter to the President dated December 14, 1917 mentioned the gravity of 
the situation in Russia:  
The Situation in Russia with its all chaos, conflicting aims and 
movements, threat of civil war and irreparable action is of greatest 
complexity and pregnant of the greatest dangers...Despite the fact that 
the doings of the Bolsheviki cannot be recognized as binding and 
representative of Russia’s aims.56  
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This excerpt illustrates hints for the inclination of Wilson not to recognize the 
Bolshevik government. Furthermore, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State during 
World War I, was also reporting about atrocities engaged in Russia by the 
Bolsheviks in his telegram dated September 18, 1918:  
In view of telegrams received yesterday revealing that a state of 
terrorism exists in Moscow and Petrograd through which thousands of 
innocent Russian citizens are being killed, it occurs to me that it might 
be desirable for this government to do what it can to prevent a 
continuance of this terrible state of affairs.57  
 
Beside such reports and the spread of revolutionary fervor abroad, Wilson’s 
ideological animus toward Bolshevism grew. According to Wilson, Bolshevism 
represented a threat to the liberal-capitalist values, constituting the basis of 
America’s moral, material power and the Fourteen Points.58 In the mean time, there 
was a common conviction that the new government in Russia was precarious. In the 
two years following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the New York Times predicted, 
in ninety one editorials, the collapse or near-collapse of the Soviet communism.59 
 The violent events and strikes before and during the war in the U.S.A. 
confirmed Wilson’s concerns. For instance, the Communist Party Manifesto and 
Program, which had aspirations to the Russian Communism lucidly summarizes the 
views of the Leftists in America:  
The world is on the verge of a new era. Europe is in revolt. The 
masses of Asia are stirring uneasily. Capitalism is in collapse. The 
workers of the world are seeing a new life and securing new courage. 
Out of night of war is coming a new day. The specter of Communism 
haunts the world of capitalism. Communism, hope of the workers to 
end misery and oppression. The workers of Russia smashed the front 
of Capitalism and Imperialism. They broke the chains of the terrible 
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war; and in the midst of agony, starvation and the attacks of the 
capitalists of the world, they are creating a new social 
order. ..Everywhere the workers are in a desperate struggle against 
their capitalists maters. The call to action had come. The workers must 
answer!!!...The Communist Party proposes to end capitalism and 
organize a workers’ industrial republic.60      
 
 The call for insurgence worried many conservatives for fear that similar 
revolutions might be imminent. While the peacemakers were arguing over the treaty 
with Germany and pondering over how to stop the spread of Bolshevism, the Red 
Scare erupted in the United States. The Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 
gave impetus to the wartime fear of radicalism and enabled conservatives to carry it 
over to the postwar Red Scare of 1919-20. Fear of Bolshevism was made more acute 
by a series of strikes and race riots in 1919 and gave focus by bombings in the U.S 
by extreme radicals.61   
 The war bred an aroused nationalism and ordinary Americans began to think 
about sabotage and subversion. Patriotic groups, veteran organizations, business 
associations, and the Catholic Church wanted to root out domestic Communism and 
all other forms of radicalism.62 Within this context, between 1918 and 1920, the 
Wilson administration organized an oppressive antiradical campaign, to eliminate 
Red Scare. This is an important period in Progressive era because although the social 
history of American workers and their families is an important focus for labor 
historians, scholars have rediscovered the role of the state in the 1990s as agent of 
repression and change and as regulator and administrator of the work environment.63  
During the period before and after World War I, attacks upon radical, pacifist 
and at times even liberal groups began directly. With the passage of the Espionage 
                                                 
60 “The Communist Party Manifesto and Program”. The Communist 1, no.1 (27 September 1919): 6-9. 
61  Kendrick A. Clements. Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman. (Chicago: G.K. Hall, 1999), p. 175. 
62  Leffler, 14. 
63  Eileen Boris and Nelson Lichtenstein “Labor and the State.” Major Problems in the History of 
American Workers. (Massachusetts: D.C Heath and Co., 1991. 
 31
Act of June 15, 1917, the repression of dissident movements became an explicit 
policy of the Wilson Administration.64 Furthermore, thirty five states passed sedition 
laws, banned display of red flags, and investigated radicals.65 In 1918, the Espionage 
and Sedition Acts, outlawing any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive language 
intended to cause contempt; scorn or disrepute to the government, the Constitution or 
the flag intensified repression of the Socialist Party.66 The government, endorsed by 
business leaders, attacked the Socialists’ antiwar stance as un-American. Hundreds 
of socialist leaders and other radicals were convicted for sedition and antiwar 
activities. Party newspapers across the country were suppressed and barred from 
mails, on account of Red Scare and a possible uprising against the Wilson 
Administration. Strikes, antiwar agitation, racial disturbances were increasingly 
blamed on foreign radicals and alien ideologies, betraying American values and 
institutions. 67  Pro-German sentiment, socialism, the IWW and trade unionism in 
general were regarded as a threat and the accusation of Bolshevism was used as a 
strong weapon for turning public opinion against strikers and political dissenters.68  
As a corollary, Wilson kept pursuing Red-baiting at a larger scale specifically 
after World War I.69  The Open-Shop strike of 1920 and 192270, the Steel and Mine 
Strikes of 1919 and the vicious “Red Raids” of 1920 allowed the Government to 
prepare the ground for the country wide attack on the working class. 71 Labeling 
opponents as Red or Bolshevik for the first time started with Woodrow Wilson. For 
example, in his campaign for Senate ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the 
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League of Nations, he called his opponents Bolsheviks, whose ideology was based 
on conflict, poverty and inequality.72 Furthermore, he linked ongoing strikes to the 
events in Russia and equated American radicals with Russian Bolsheviks.73 For this 
reason, Wilson did not recognize the government in Russia.  
In conjunction with the Espionage and Sedition Acts, more than 2100 cases 
were brought to trial in the United States. Socialists, pacifists, radical laborers and 
anyone resisting the patriotism were tried.74 During the Red Scare of 1919 and the 
early 1920s, the membership of both communist parties declined dramatically since 
wartime espionage and sedition acts were now used against communists and 
anarchists as Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer directed unannounced raids 
against their homes and headquarters.75 The most prominent prosecution was that of 
Eugene Debs on June 1918 on account of his antiwar speech in Canton, Ohio. Even 
when he was sentenced to ten years, he stated that he was accused of having 
obstructed the war and he admitted it because he abhorred war and would oppose the 
war if he stood alone. Debs served thirty two months until he was pardoned by 
President Warren G. Harding in 1921. In the spring and summer of 1919, several 
bombings took place. In return, federal officials organized raids to root out 
subversives of the IWW and their alleged Russian connections at the Union of 
Russian Workers.76 Thousands of people were arrested for being Communist. Many 
of the arrested people were flagrantly labeled as illegal and 840 people were 
deported.77     
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Consequently, the Great War created economic, social and political 
dislocations that reshaped American life. On the one hand, the rise of American left 
challenged U.S. foreign policy and influenced America’s attitude towards 
Bolshevism and involvement into World War I through anti-war and anti-
conscription campaigns. On the other hand, the right wing of labor, the American 
Federation of Labor, supported the national foreign policy. Without doubt, foreign 
policy had repercussions in domestic policy. Patriotic fervor and the exaggerated 
specter of Bolshevism were used to repress radicalism, organized labor, feminism, 
and the entire legacy of progressive reform. 78  What was significant about the 
Wilsonian foreign policy was that it was antagonized by the Reds under the umbrella 
of the Socialist Party in the United States, for the first time. It tried to delay 
conscription by anti-war demonstrations and speeches. The Leftist movement, at the 
heart of capitalism, made its biggest strike to come to power through elections and 
found great appeal among the pacifists. In addition, it dexterously made use of anti-
war stance of the immigrants. However, to make an overall assessment, as Herman 
Kayserling and Len Samson, argued the movement was short-lived between two 
world wars because the social content of socialism, with the big exception of 
property relations, is similar to what Americans think that they already have such as 
a democratic, socially classless, anti-elitist society.79 Furthermore, Wilson and many 
ordinary Americans made associations between Bolshevism and the rhetoric of the 
Socialist Party and concluded that what they suggest was totally against the very 
nature of American character and institutions. Left Movement and immigrants, 
supporting it, were perceived as un-American and disloyal. For this reason, 
nationwide Red-baiting was initiated and thousands were arrested for un-American 
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deeds. Consequently, the Left movement was curbed down until the emergence of 
the Cold War after World War II.     
Woodrow Wilson’s universalism, though it remained utopian managed to 
emphasize that the world was in need of an international institution. According to 
Wilson’s doctrine expressed in the Fourteen Points, freedom of markets was wedded 
to political democracy and the self-determination of peoples, merging the ambitions 
of American ideals and interests with a concept of global peace and stability. 80 
That’s why, his global strategy was transposed into his domestic policy to curb down 
the radical labor movements and to enhance rapprochement with the right wing of 
labor, represented by the AFL. Wilson’s ideology concerning the protection of 
freedom of markets and welfare of American society at the global level was also 
pursued by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  
As to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s81 vision, these were the fundamental ideals 
interests to protect American economy and for that reason, any recession or 
disturbance caused by wars should have been avoided. For this reason, Roosevelt’s 
efforts were directed to construct a mechanism for security policy based on the 
United Nations and his basic assumption was that if there was an unimpeded increase 
in international trade, then the peace would be long-lasting.82  
On the other hand, Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the USSR in 1933 and 
opened the diplomatic relations since Russia became the largest buyer of American 
industrial equipments as well as agricultural products and Roosevelt wanted to 
surround Russia in America’s policy about Cuba. However, the AFL leaders opposed 
to American recognition of Russia, which had an ideology in breach of American 
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liberalism and capitalism. They refused to have any relations with Soviet trade 
unions or to send a delegation to the USSR to inspect their conditions. During the 
1920s and the 1930s, some labor unions lost members on account of dual unionism, 
manipulation of workers by employers leading to yellow unionization. During this 
two decades, the attacks on labor accompanied by the anti-red hysteria inaugurated 
by ‘the American Plan’, aiming to replace the legitimate unions with company 
unions. Without doubt, this system put the unionist under the restriction of the 
employers and the ‘Yellow Dog’ system (individual contract) system turned into a 
substitute for collective bargaining.83 Until the market crash of 1929, the unions lost 
half of their 5,000,000 members. The initiation of the Great Depression turned the 
labor unions into skeletons. Workers wanting to go on strike for threatening to be 
expelled from their workplace or to be replaced by African-American workers; some 
were beaten, or they were controlled by selling jobs, kickbacks and extortion from 
employers for strike insurance and sweetheart contracts.84   
In the ranks of the AFL, it became common to label their opponents as 
Communist. As of the 1920s, basing on the Wilsonian experience, some union 
constitutions began to include provisions barring Communists or persons associating 
with Communists from membership or denying their rights to run for office. 85 
However, the tactic of labeling all opponents as Communists became a practical 
weapon to combat advocates of progressive reforms and challenges to leadership that 
were not related with Communism at all.86 
To conclude so far, the red-scare emerged in early 20th century and paved 
way to radicalism during President Woodrow Wilson’s term. After 1920, nation-
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wide red-bait was initiated in that even the labor unions were labeling each other as 
being red. Hence, the unity of labor unions was challenged ideologically for the first 
time. On the other hand, the economic depression of the 1930s caused distress among 
the workers and the unions. The New Deal was a testing period for the unions and it 
was a matter of life or death. Some of the unions got closed on account of financial 
crisis while some survived. For this reason, the mobility spirit of the country united 
all different fronts of thoughts during World War II as well as the workers and the 
Great Depression memories faded away.  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
As it can bee seen above, as of late 19th century, the labor unions had been 
interested in foreign policy of their country. The doctrines such as Manifest Destiny, 
the Monroe Doctrine and Open Door laid the foundation for American expansionism 
both in terms of territory and sphere of influence. American foreign affairs in general 
had been governed by essentially expansionist assumptions as America competed 
with the colonial powers toward the turn of the 20th century. The idea of expansion as 
the ‘destiny’ of American democracy was linked to the country’s financial and 
industrial establishment, advocating free trade and the opening of international 
markets as the nation’s primary historical interest.87  Democrats, Republicans, big 
labor and businesses that could profit by U.S. internationalism tended to support such 
expansion. Except the opposition to outright annexation of Hawaii, the AFL, in 
general, supported American adventures abroad while the CIO’s left wing stood 
                                                 
87 Romero, 4. 
 37
against American foreign policy and the right wing of the CIO was supportive of U.S. 
governments.88   
Bipartisan agreement between labor unions and government emerged in late 
19th century. Both the AFL and the CIO assumed a uniquely important role in U.S. 
expansionism, fueled by this consensus, which has characterized most of the U.S. 
foreign policy since the late 1890s.89 Both federations had a sober sense of mission 
about American responsibilities regarding the struggling democracies elsewhere.90 
Top AFL leaders including Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell of the United Mine 
Workers and Daniel J. Keefe of the International Longshoremen, Marine and 
Transport Workers’ Union- had established a labor-business coalition. These 
industrialists served on the National Civic Federation (NCF), with key members of 
American industrialists and financial elite. The NCF was established as a tripartite 
body in 1900 aiming to reduce conflict between employers and workers in the 
capitalist economy. In exchange for giving up radical demands for supporting the 
capitalists system, the unions represented in the NCF won recognition of their 
organizations. Hence, they obtained material and political gains. Among the 
employers represented at the NFC, there were notorious union-busters such as Mark 
Hanna, J. Ogden Armour (whose workers were defined as white slaves by the AFL 
investigation committee) and Cyrus H. McCormick.91Thus, involvement of labor in 
American foreign policy illustrates how wide the scope of the U.S. globalism was.    
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
EARLY COLD WAR: TRUMAN DOCTRINE, THE MARSHALL 
PLAN AND LABOR 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The period of 1945 and 1949 has been a turning point in the history of the 
world since it marks the end of World War II and establishment of a new world order, 
which began to be shaped by bipolarized superpowers, the US and the USSR. This 
also illustrates how the world turned into a chess-board altered by these two foes’ 
strategies until the 1990s. Thus, the aim of this chapter; after providing a general 
perspective on the emergence of Cold War, including  its origins and past grievances, 
post-World War II labor union cooperation, international labor organizations, anti-
Communism, the AFL-CIO’ leading unionists and Irving Brown’s international 
strategy   will be explained. The indoctrination of American policy through the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan covering not only military, economic but 
also social assistance components, including labor, will be explained. The chapter 
aims to conclude and illustrate that labor was an intrinsic Cold War value.   
 
3.2. Prelude on the Origins of Cold War 
Concerns about the communism appeared in the US in early 20th century; 
however, the ideological concerns took shape when the USSR put much of Eastern 
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Europe under its sphere of influence after defeating Germany from 1945 onwards.92 
Between 1945 and 1949, the US incrementally began to assume the role of a 
hegemon, in the aftermath of the Second World War because Russia, devastated by 
war, was casting ideological threat to the world. To understand the origins of the 
Cold War era, what caused two parties to suspect each other before 1945 should be 
mentioned.  
During World War I, a large part of Russia was under German occupation 
and national minorities were fighting each other for autonomy in today’s Ukraine, 
Moldova and Eastern Europe. In the meantime, Russia was suffering from drastic 
famine and poverty. Thus, the Bolshevik government needed humanitarian aid and 
saw that they should get on well with the West and the US.  
In 1919, while peacemakers were arguing over a peace treaty with Germany 
and thinking on how to stop the spread of Bolshevism, Red Scare erupted in the US 
because the Russian Revolution and the Communist risings in central and Eastern 
Europe scared the American radicals and conservatives.93  
In 1921, The US Congress responded to Russia’s call for aid and provided 
assistance in the amount of $20 million. However, President Wilson had antipathy 
towards the Bolshevik government because Lenin disbanded the Constituent 
Assembly, the most democratically elected body in Russia, because of loss of seats in 
the Assembly. 94  Furthermore, Lenin refused to pay off the debts of the former 
Russian governments to the US. For these two reasons, Wilson did not want to 
recognize the Bolshevik government. He knew that Bolshevik domestic policy would 
fail and it did leading to famine; but, Wilson was scared that their rhetoric would 
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capture the Europeans and erode the Allied support for the war.95  So, as of the 1920s, 
anti-bolshevism was instilled in the US since it was believed that Bolshevism’s roots 
were conflict, poverty and inequality. 96  In 1933, the Bolshevik government was 
finally officially recognized.   
During World War II, Stalin waged war against Germany, occupying its 
territories and defeated Hitler’s army, with the support of the US, France and Britain. 
Meanwhile, Harry Truman succeeded Franklin D. Roosevelt as president before the 
end of the war.   
Towards the end of World War II, the allies convened to discuss the shape 
and future of Europe. The Yalta Conference was the wartime meeting over February 
4 to 11, 1945 between the heads of government of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The delegations were headed 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin respectively. At the 
end of the War, the Potsdam Conference was held in Potsdam, Germany from July 
17 to August 2, 1945. The participants were the victorious allies, who were to decide 
how to administer Germany, which had unconditionally surrendered nine weeks 
earlier. Participants were the United States (President Harry S. Truman), the Soviet 
Union (Joseph Stalin), and United Kingdom (Winston Churchill and later Clement 
Attlee). The Potsdam Agreement envisaged the division of Germany and Austria into 
four occupation zones (agreed on earlier at the Yalta Conference), and the similar 
division of Berlin and Vienna into four zones.   
The Soviet Union's aggressive, antidemocratic policy toward Eastern Europe 
had created tensions even before the war ended. Therefore, the western allies were 
suspicious of the motives of Stalin, who had already encouraged satellite communist 
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governments in the eastern European countries under his influence; the Potsdam 
conference turned out to be the last conference among the allies. During the 
conference, Truman told Stalin about his powerful new weapon. Stalin, of course, 
knew already about the atomic bomb through his spies in the Manhattan project. 
Toward the end of the conference, Japan was given an ultimatum. Though Japan was 
inclined to give up the war, the US dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, which can be interpreted as a warning message to the communist Russia. 
As a corollary, Stalin sensed that the US was hardening its position.97 At the end of 
World War II, Stalin realized that achievements of his goals –territorial gains, 
national reconstructionism and control over the Eastern Europe and Japan-, depended 
on a cooperation with the Allies. Thus, Stalin would be able to get reparations from 
Germany and protect his interest in the Ruhr region, rich in coal, steel, metallurgy 
and chemical industries. On the other hand, Stalin would not compromise his basic 
territorial rights and he wanted to create a sphere of political influence in the Eastern 
Europe and control Germany and Japan.    
Stalin had to be friendly toward the West but in the mean time, wanted to 
implement his policy of influence shrewdly. For instance, Stalin promised Roosevelt 
at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that he would declare war on Japan to 
eliminate its threat to Asia. However, the fears of the US were verified because on 
August 1945, Russian armies attacked and took over Manchuria and occupied 
Northern Korea; and immediately, Russia began to support communist movements, 
in these countries. Furthermore, seeing that his country was vulnerable in the South, 
Stalin had to safeguard his periphery. He wanted to control traffic through the 
Turkish Straits into the Black Sea and sought naval bases, air-transit rights and 
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petroleum concessions from Iran.98 For instance, Russia had already sent its first note 
in 1939 to Turkey expressing Russia’s territorial and security claims.   
The first conflict between the US and the USSR occurred over Poland and 
free elections were supposed to be held in Poland in accordance with the Yalta 
Conference. Yet, Russia manipulated the elections and took Poland under its 
preponderance. However, Poland was highly important for the allies since it 
constituted a buffer zone against Russia and Poland’s security was a matter of life 
and death. Yet, it was too late and Poland became Russia’s domain. Furthermore, 
Stalin started to take over Eastern Europe as of 1945 and denied national autonomy 
to Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. Stalin supported the communist parties in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which later refused to act in accordance with 
Stalin’s demands. In so doing, Stalin’s true aim was to get foreign communist 
parties’ support to serve the interests of the communist Russia. This also illustrated 
the fragility of democratic institutions and the weakness of democratic parties in 
Europe.99 In addition, Stalin furthered his assertions with his demands on Turkey.100 
Thus, the wartime alliance ended, and the Cold War began. The Truman Doctrine, 
the Marshall Plan and the initiatives in Germany were decisive moves in the 
development of the Cold War.  
 Stalin for the first time expressed in his famous speech of February 1946 that 
the war had arisen as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and 
political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism. Although later on Stalin 
expressed that he was for ideological co-existence of capitalism and communism in 
the world, he always kept his suspicions and concerns against the US and believed 
that a conflict with the West was imminent. Meanwhile, George Kennan, a top 
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official at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, stated in a long telegram he sent to the State 
Department in 1946 that the US should pursue a containment policy against Russia 
since it was becoming more and more expansionist.   
From the standpoint of Stalin, he was frustrated at the policies of the West 
and reasons for expansionism. For instance, he was indignant at Western intervention 
on behalf of the White Russians during the Russian Civil War of 1918-21. He also 
believed that capitalism encouraged Hitler to attack Russia on 22 June 1941. 
Furthermore, he protested the delay of the Western forces to the second front during 
war. Stalin was exasperated by the West’s attempts to limit German reparations to be 
made to Russia in return for the damages the Germans caused during World War 
II.101 Ultimately, the development of atomic bombs and American atomic monopoly, 
which was demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki endangered Soviet security.     
By mid-1947, communism was viewed as an ideological threat by the 
Americans and the actions of America came into being as a result of concerns about 
the USSR’s chance of manipulating the power vacuum, worldwide financial 
hardships, exchange controls, emergence of popular Communist parties especially in 
China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe. As a reaction to the increasing tension created 
by dissemination of Russia’s communism in Poland, Germany and Asia, the US 
aimed to contain the Soviet influence and communism. 
With this end, the officials in Washington sought not only to generate a cold 
war consensus at home but also to organize most of the world into an American-led 
orbit. Incrementally, the US had an unprecedented leadership role in the international 
arena. 102  At home, anti-communist campaigns were supported. For instance, the 
House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was established to search pro-
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communist activities and activists. The HUAC especially investigated the Hollywood 
industry in late 1947, which attracted the public attention to a great extent. On the 
other hand, the businessmen associations and politicians were attacking the workers’ 
unions and the civil rights advocates. Ultimately, The Truman administration 
managed to incorporate the support of the Americans from different regions, social 
strata and economic backgrounds against communism and Russia. Furthermore, the 
US assumed a role of hegemon and responsibility for rebuilding Europe, ensuring the 
security of its friends and overseeing the functioning of the world economy.103 After 
cultivating the domestic constituencies, Truman worked hard to gain international 
acceptance of anti-communist American foreign policy and did this through 
persuasion, inducements and financial leverage.104     
For this purpose the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were introduced 
in 1947. The concerns both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan were based on 
was the fact that the communists were on the verge of seizing power in France, Italy 
and Greece. If the communists came to power, then, the USSR’s influence in Europe 
would create totalitarian regimes and bind their economy.   
Harry Truman stated at Congress on March 12, 1947 that with Truman 
Doctrine, the United States would support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The doctrine was 
specifically aimed at assisting governments resisting communism such as Greece and 
Turkey, who did not receive the aid that they needed, they would inevitably fall to 
communism with the result being a domino effect of acceptance of communism. 
Truman signed the act into law on May 22, 1947 which granted $400 millions in 
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military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece. So, it can be said that the Truman 
Doctrine was what American policy to be pursued would be.  
 On June 1947, the Marshall Plan followed aiming the reconstruction of 
Europe in the aftermath of World War II. Marshall asked troubled European nations 
to draw up a program to prevent hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. The Soviets 
participated in the first planning meeting, then departed rather than share economic 
data on their resources and problems, and submit to Western controls on the 
expenditure of the aid. The remaining 16 nations requested reaching $17 millions for 
a four-year period and in early 1948 Congress voted to assist European economic 
recovery. 
    The key geographic area that brought America and Russia face-à-face was 
Germany and the blockade with which Russia separated Germany into west and east. 
America felt obliged to take diplomatic and economic risks because the communist 
threat was right at the doorstep of Western Europe and western economies would 
suffer if German coal production would falter.105 For this purpose, American forces 
were deployed in West Germany and provided food to the Germans. France, Britain 
and America combined zones in Germany because Russia had broken the Yalta deal 
by occupying the Eastern Germany. In return for the unification of the trizonia, on 
June 23, 1948, Russia blockaded Berlin and cut all access to the West. As a 
retaliation, the US implemented airlift to prove their determination by distributing 
food supplies from the air to the Germans.  
Meanwhile, under the American leadership, the North Atlantic Treaty was 
established in 1949. On April 4, 1949, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was established as an international organization for defense collaboration, in 
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support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, D.C.  The core provision 
of the treaty was Article V, which was intended so that if the Soviet Union launched 
an attack against the European allies of the United States, it would be treated as if it 
was an attack on the United States itself. Thus, the Kremlin retreated before 
Truman’s strength demonstrations. Stalin, fearful of war and recognizing the 
weakness of his country, retreated rather challenging the American airlift. Therefore, 
Russia abandoned the blockade.    
  
3.3. Post-World War II Labor Union Cooperation, International Labor 
organizations; Anti-Communism, the AFL-CIO and Irving Brown 
Throughout the 20th century, the United States played a significant role in the 
world and the collapse of the European powers, in the aftermath of World War II, 
opened the arena to an expanded U.S. presence. Both in political and economic terms, 
the U.S. began to dominate the world. In 1950, the U.S. produced 40% of world’s 
goods and services while it was building up strong military forces and the military 
spending jumped from $13 billion in 1950 to $50 billion in 1953. 106  With the 
leverage provided by its economic and military resources, the US ruled the world 
politics and economy. Major actors of the economy were coming from the working 
class.   
 During the post-war, the tripartite collaboration between labor unions, 
government and business sector was formalized by Nelson Rockefeller, head of the 
State Department’s Office of Inter-American Affairs during World War II. 107 
Between 1939 and 1945, entire American labor unions cooperated with business 
sector and government. This wartime cooperation enabled mass-production to 
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support military equipments for the U.S. forces dispatched to Europe. On the other 
hand, labor radicalism sympathizing with socialism was curbed down. The wartime 
coalition has manifested in various forms.108The American Federation of Labor’s 
anticommunist activities in postwar Europe were financed by private sector and the 
Central Intelligence Agency. To give a lucid example; the American Institute for 
Free Labor Development board included trustees both from big business and labor 
leaders as well as American companies operating in Latin America- such as 
Kennecott and Anaconda copper companies, ITT, Pan American World Airways, the 
Rockefellers and W.R. Grace, Exxon, Shell, IBM, Koppers and Gillette.109 Beside 
these companies another 90 corporations with their holdings in Latin America 
supported the AIFLD financially though never in sums approaching the U.S. 
government’s contributions. 110  According to Roosevelt, an uninterrupted 
international trade would be the insurance of a long-lasting peace. As a corollary, 
these concerns were concentrated in an all-embracing concept of national security 
which led the Truman Administration to use international economic policy as a tool 
for establishing stability and guaranteeing security.111   
The tradition of the Open Door policy, American commercial interests, the 
increased interdependence of the world economy, and the ambition to convert the 
country’s increased influence into supremacy pushed American leaders to find in an 
increasing volume of international trade as the driving force for expansion. With 
credits provided to the Allies during World War II, the Breton Woods Accords112 
and then the negotiation of a loan for Great Britain, the U.S. imposed its own 
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understanding of a multilateral trade system for furthering growth.113 As Truman 
stated: 
A large volume of soundly based international trade is essential if we 
are to achieve prosperity in the United States, build a durable structure 
of world economy and attain our goal of world peace and 
prosperity.114 
 
Hence the goal of prosperity was the basic aspect of the postwar order and a vital 
element in securing the peace.  
Wartime psychology cast positive impacts on the American society. Women 
and men, businessmen and workers unified their powers under the aegis of 
mobilization. This solidarity between the government, citizens, labor unions and 
businessmen faded the memory of the Great Depression and the concerns caused by 
the New Deal policies of Roosevelt. The wartime situation strengthened the 
significance of the labor unions and at the end of the war, union membership jumped 
from 10 million to 14.5 million. The large industrial unions of the Congress of 
Industrial Organization had already taken root in major industries of the country.115 
The steel tonnage and the kilowatt hours produced became source of pride for the 
Americans and public opinion’s agreement on production and efficiency helped 
bridge the divisions in domestic policy. The emphasis on output and growth emerged 
as a logical result of New Deal and wartime controversies.116  
The fear of postwar period was dominant at the labor unions. At the wartime, 
solidarity was achieved and more and more workers were employed. What would 
happen after 1945? A recession in economy was expected both by the CIO and the 
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AFL. The postwar stance of the CIO, which included the unions by industry fields 
rather than crafts, was immediately identified by its leader unionists. So, in order to 
cope with any economic recession, the CIO proposed foreign aid, the breakup of 
monopolies, economic cooperation in order to expand international trade, and the 
presence of unions at the peace table and in international organizations.117 According 
to the CIO, the guiding principle was to continue the international anti-Fascist 
coalition and the alliance with the USSR. This was its future framework for 
international cooperation, economic growth and social advancement.118 
The CIO originated in the New Deal period with no political or ideological 
biases but it had a Communist inspired left-wing, which made the CIO discredited in 
the eye of the government. As a corollary, the CIO’s call for furthering cooperation 
in the field of labor with the USSR received little response from Roosevelt. 
Furthermore, the internal unity of the CIO was at the stake of dissolution. Its unity 
broke for the first time between 1939 and 1941 following Stalin’s pact with Nazi 
Germany and it was restored in the atmosphere of the anti-Fascist alliance when its 
left wing firmly advocated productivity as a patriotic cause.119 The second turmoil 
period began in the CIO between the leftist coalition and the anti-Communist group 
led by Walter Reuther, who was once indignant at the AFL’s policies. Now, Reuther 
was ready to break away from the CIO in 1947.  
While on the one hand the CIO regarded inclusion of the USSR as a 
complementary element, on the other hand, it was supporting establishment of 
international mechanisms discussed at Breton Woods since such efficient mechanism 
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would guarantee more jobs and that is why its motto was ‘five million jobs for U.S. 
on postwar world trade’.  
Both the AFL and the CIO held that development of trade on a multilateral 
basis, American foreign aid and the development of new markets were vital goals for 
foreign policy of American unions during the postwar reconstruction. By the same 
token, there was a traditional adherence to the idea of expanding American 
capitalism, dating back to early 20th century in the AFL; yet, it was still in a 
formative stage for the CIO.120  
As to the AFL, established under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, it 
assembled all craft unions. It strongly supported America’s investments made in 
Latin America in late 19th century and it was characterized as nationalist and anti-
Socialist. In fact much of labor press reflected anti-war sentiment during America’s 
firs imperialist venture with the war against Spain in 1898 and the majority of the 
unionists opposed to American intervention. Yet, when some unionists like Samuel 
Gompers, out of fear of having their Americanism questioned, he and other major 
leaders climbed aboard the war-makers’ ship and supported the gunboat diplomacy 
of the USA in Latin America. 121  Furthermore, Matthew Woll, the AFL’s 
international affairs chairman played major role in devising ‘labor pan-Americanism’, 
a fraternity with suitable labor leaders below the Rio Grande to complement the US 
attempts at making South America its exclusive domain.122 
On the other hand, it was supporting the growth of trade unions in 
international arena according to a nonpolitical model of the International Labor 
Organization, established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. This type of unions 
positioned on such an axis would form new outlets for American exports and reduce 
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competition based on low labor costs. Thus, strengthening of the AFL’s influence 
abroad would be in the economic interest of American wage earners and American 
industry in general and in the mean time, liberal democratic values and consumption 
based American way of life would be disseminated. 123  The nationalistic and 
civilizing mission of this model was less important for the CIO leader while the 
economic logic was not substantially different as expressed by Philip Murray and 
Walter Reuther, who accentuated the social and public benefits of international 
prosperity model rather than its advantages for American industry. 124  Yet, 
differences in political orientations resulted in conflicting programs after World War 
II.  
According to the AFL, leaders the USSR was threatening totalitarian regime 
and no cooperation should have been sustained contrary to the CIO programs. The 
AFL always put emphasis of American values such as liberalism, freedom of 
expression and individualism as it was expressed by George Meany, secretary 
treasurer of the AFL on 5 April 1945: 
Freedom of thought and expression must be safeguarded throughout 
the world. This is the ultimate moral purpose…for which we are 
fighting the Second World War. Tyrannical governments which would 
crush out freedom of thought in their own lands endanger spiritual 
freedom everywhere.125     
 
Hence, anti-communism became the motto of the AFL. In the jargon of the 
AFL, ‘free trade unions’ were regarded as free from domination by political parties 
or governments, in other words the unions had to be anti-communist, pro-West and 
anti-Soviet.  
Anti-communism was not limited to the AFL per se. In the 1930s and during 
the war, the ILGWU built up a network of contacts with militant anti-Fascist in 
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various European countries through Social Democratic refugees and the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITWF), including many European railroad 
workers. 126  Once the USA entered into war, these contacts became information 
channel for the Office of Strategic Services, newly established American intelligence 
service aiming to collect information about war. Its labor section was governed by 
Arthur J. Goldberg, a top level representative of the CIO. This situation led to a 
comprehensive network of communication, support and financial aid to European 
trade union leaders, most of whom were Social Democrats and anti Stalinist and 
some of them were in exile seeking refuge in the USA. David Dubinsky and 
Matthew Woll, vice-president of the AFL worked on contacts between the OSS and 
the European resistance, aiming to restore their contact to leadership positions in 
European unions and to prevent them against the Communist influence.127   
The AFL also channeled a million dollar fund to the establishment of Free 
Trade Union Committee (FTUC) after World War II and its aim was to continue 
collecting information for the AFL and assist the reconstruction of ‘free’ trade unions 
in Europe and the rest of the world, in opposition to Communist influence.  
Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown, who both were anti-Communist and anti-
Stalinist, were brought to the committee to synchronize information flow from 
Europe. Both Lovestone and Brown were interesting characters. Lovestone, émigré 
of Lithuania, was a former member of the Communist Party in America and since he 
supported Bukharin, he became the scapegoat of the Communist Party and got 
expelled. In the 1930s, he changed side and began to support anti-communist 
political stance at the labor unions. He cooperated with David Dubinsky, the ILGWU 
as well as the UAW. As of 1940, he became Dubinsky’s advisor in his clandestine 
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contacts with Europe. He was characterized by conspirational and semi-clandestine 
methods of the FTUC. Irving Brown worked with Jay Lovestone in Germany in 1945 
to organize labor resistance against the Nazis and Brown advised the American 
occupation forces during the last phase of the bloody war in Germany.  
Lovestone and Brown, drawing on their experiences in the field, foresaw a 
rupture was imminent between the West and the USSR. Specifically Lovestone 
believed that the USSR would follow a destabilization policy in economy and social 
areas as this was outcome the USSR learned on account of its isolation during World 
War I. According to these two protagonists, the labor unions would have a strategic 
role and the USSR would do its best to control them through the rhetoric of 
comradeship. Hence, Lovestone concluded that the FTUC should start its own 
crusade for the reconstruction of ‘free’ trade unions as the pillars of anti-Soviet 
stabilization in Europe.128 
Therefore, a memorandum was prepared by the Vice-President of the AFL, 
Matthew Woll as it read:  
The labor movement of the European countries will be divided 
geographically and ideologically into two groups in accordance with 
the division of Europe itself into two ‘spheres of influence. The 
socialist and democratic labor movement will have to endure a very 
hard struggle for survival…The Communists will enjoy full freedom 
of propaganda and activity. They will even be presented in the 
governments and the administration of individual countries. With the 
help of the mighty Russian state and a powerful internationally 
coordinated and streamlined propaganda machine they will strive for 
the domination of the labor movement in every country. 129 
 
Basing on this strategy, where the Communists were weak in the Netherlands, 
Norway, Luxemburg, the unions would remain in the hands of democratic elements 
and the FTUC would intervene with a direct contribution to the treasuries of the 
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labor unions.130 As to Austria and Germany, the AFL would support the part in 
Western occupation as generously as possible. The FTUC concluded to publish a 
bulletin in French and German to inform the unionists about the American way of 
unionization.131  
Throughout the postwar period, a group of leaders such as Matthew Woll, 
David Dubinsky, Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown were the ones drafting and 
applying international labor policy under the supervision of George Meany and the 
OSS. In the operations of the FTUC, priority was given to Germany and organization 
of resistance movement, composed of workers against the Nazis in the spring of 
1945. Later, France and Italy appeared in their agenda of unionization value trade-off.  
The AFL was always in full coordination with the Department of State and 
the OSS. During early 1945, the AFL proposed the Secretary of State to open labor 
attaché positions in order to better harmonize the activities of American labor unions 
in Europe. The AFL’s aspiration was to stimulate the government in using labor 
unions and social issues in American foreign policy making, which was a logical 
strategy to fight against communism.132 
However, passionate struggles of the AFL caused its isolation from the 
international trade union movement. Before moving onto the Marshall Plan and the 
Truman Doctrine, it will be appropriate to focus briefly on two major international 
movements between leftist World Federation of Labor Unions and the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.  
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3.3.1. Internationalization of Labor: World Federation of Labor Unions and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
Parallel to the emergence of industrialism in the 19th century, a working class 
came into being. In order to fight the improper working conditions at factories, steel 
mills and sweat-shops in the industrial Northern part of America and in Europe, the 
workers started to get organized and unionized. Hence, following the establishment 
of guilds and unions, there came the international confederations around the 1940s. 
Until then, majority of the unions were trying to identify their identity and parallel to 
World War II, the political stance of international labor confederations became clear. 
Early Cold War developments also caused bipolarization of labor unions in the world. 
The aim of this title is, first of all, to provide a general picture of international labor 
organizations; how and why they were established and how they got influenced by 
Cold War. Use of such a descriptive method of history shall facilitate to understand 
where and how labor fits in American foreign policy. Hence, the second part of this 
title is to elaborate the rise of labor in American foreign policy, including the Cold 
War era.  
 
3.3.2. World Federation of Labor Unions  
The post- World War II developments in the international labor movements 
were highly influenced by the initiation of Cold War and labor became an important 
tool to reshape the working classes and to inseminate democratic world’s ideals. For 
this reason, it is necessary to have a general look at the labor unionism developments 
in the world.  
It is the World War II era when the most intensive contacts started to take 
place among the labor unions of different countries. The early contacts turned into 
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concrete steps at the London Conference of 6-17 February 1945. This conference 
united 53 international and national labor unions and 204 delegates represented 60 
million unionized workers.133 As a fruit of this conference, the World Federation of 
Labor Unions (WFLU) was established in Paris in 1945.  
The first congress of the World Federation of Labor Unions convened 
between September 25 and October 8, 1945, with the participation of 64 national 
organizations and 20 international organizations representing 67 millions of 
workers.134 The aim was to establish a board to harmonize the works of labor unions 
at the international level. The newly established board was reflecting strong 
international support for creation of an international institution. The board consisted 
of the followings:, Walter Citrine as president, from the British Trades Union 
Congress (TUC); Louis Saillant as secretary general from the General Confederation 
of French Workers; V. V. Kouznetsov (the USSR), S. Hilman (USA), L. Jouhaux 
(France), V. Lombardo Toledano (Mexico), H. F. Chu (China), G.Di Vittorio (Italy) 
and E. Kupers (the Netherlands) were elected as vice-presidents and members of 
executives, while J. Brophy (the USA), M. Faline (the USSR) and W. Schevenes 
(Belgium) were elected as deputy-secretaries.135 The AFL was excluded from the 
WFLU on account of its cutting-edge anti-Communist policies. 
This new international labor union action had three major objectives: 
"Assistance to under-developed countries, fight against fascism and against workers’ 
liberties and economic rights ".136 The WFTU’s manifesto also called for the total 
destruction of fascism, support for democratic reconstruction of Germany and Japan, 
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cooperation of Allies at the Unites Nations, the representation of all unions at 
international meetings on peace treaties and reconstruction as well as the end of 
racial and colonial repression, the adoption of full employment and social security 
policies.137 
Without doubt, this movement did not take place out of blue. International 
Association of Workers’ was established in 1864 by Marx and Engels though it did 
not bear labor union characteristics. Yet, it had all the political workers’ movement 
components. Nonetheless, ideological dissidences paved way to its dissolution in 
1876. Although it was a short-lived umbrella association, it played an important role 
in the evolution of workers’ political consciousness. Inspired by the International 
Association of Workers, many countries established their own national labor unions 
such as the TUC in 1868 in Britain, the AFL in 1881 in the USA, the CGT in 1895 in 
France, the DGB in 1892 in Germany, the UGT in 1884 in Spain and the CGT in 
1906 in Italy.138   
In these countries, labor unions developed according to the realities and 
characteristics of their geographies and political administrations. In order to 
synchronize international movements, International Professional Secretariats were 
created in 1903 and transformed into International Federation of Labor Unions 
(IFLU), in 1913, which can be considered as the first attempt to create an 
international center. 139 The IFLU had three major political tendencies: American 
unionism, German unionism which led to the Second International and anarchist-
unionism. The records illustrate that the IFLU had 22 millions of worker members. 
After World War II broke out, all labor unions supported their countries and 
contributed a great to the production of weapons, ammunition and food-stuff for their 
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armies. On account of a world-wide war, IFLU could not convene or carry out any 
joint activities during the war. 
Communist tendency among the labor unions was supported by the USSR. 
Upon its initiative, International Red Labor Unions (IRLU) was established in 1921 
in order to protest American capitalism. In 1926, it had 13 million members.   
The International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ICCTU) was 
established in 1920 in the Hague. It was suppressed during World War II and 
reestablished in 1945 in Brussels. Its aim was to unite the Christian labor unions in 
the world and enhance cooperation among them. Later in 1968, it decided to abandon 
the religious reference and transformed its name into International Confederation of 
Labor Unions.140  
During the antebellum between 1918 and 1939, political disagreements 
emerged between the IRLU, the ICCTU and the IFLU, particularly, on account of 
clash between communism and capitalism. As of the post-war era, it can be seen that 
international workers movement’s unity and independence was fragmented into two 
major groups according to new political evolutions: communism vs. capitalism. 
Hence, in 1949, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was 
established.  
The Cold War climate was also felt in France and as a result, France decided 
to throw World Federation of Labor Unions out of its territory in 1949. Thus, Vienna 
replaced its former headquarters in Paris. In 1956, Austria banned the WFLU and the 
headquarters was moved into Prague, in former Czechoslovakia. In 1985, the FWLU 
had 84 national labor unions from 74 countries and 11 International Labor Unions 
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and represented 206 million workers in the entire world. The WFLU still has leftist 
tendency, today.  
 
3.3.3. International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU); the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and the CIO 
In the aftermath of World War II, international political arena turned into 
bipolar world order. Although the war exhausted Europe and the USSR, the latter 
still remained as a super-power while the former needed a financial leverage to 
redress itself. The other polar of the world order, the USA, emerged as the super-
power to challenge the USSR. Without doubt, the bi-polarism turned into a policy of 
securing the periphery meaning that the USA provided financial and ideological 
assistance to protect the democratic political systems. As of 1945, the bi-polarism 
was also reflected into industrial relations, modes of production as well as 
unionization of workers.       
Parallel to massive political and economic involvement of America into 
Europe, at the industrial relations level, it also started to play an important role 
through internationalization of the American Federation of Labor. Through such 
pone, the purpose was to challenge the International Federation of Labor Unions, 
which gradually began to support socialism.    
The AFL was the only American member of the IFTU since only one 
organization per country was able to be a member. Particularly, the CIO resented at 
this and insisted on being part of American delegation to the International Labor 
Organization and the IFTU in order to break the monopoly of the AFL at the 
international level. 141  Although the AFL defended its own status as the sole 
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international representative of American labor, the IFTU accepted the CIO to the 
British Trade Union Conference, in order to increase the number of its members 
through incorporation of the CIO and the Russians.  
Yet, the AFL rejected to join the London Conference of February 1945 which 
was overshadowed by the meetings at Yalta. At this conference, the AFL was 
expelled from the IFTU. The AFL, not affiliated with the IFTU, was the first agency 
to fulfill the objectives of the anti-communism plan in Europe. Irving Brown and Jay 
Lovestone, representatives of the AFL to Europe, were leaders of this plan and had 
already started to support America’s war in the labor fronts and they successfully 
organized German and French workers against the Nazi regime through the CIA 
funds in 1945.   
As of May 1945, their new assignment was to fight against communism. 
Hence, In September 1946, the AFL adopted a resolution envisaging that it would 
engage into the resurrection of liberal unionism, which is an indispensable safeguard 
for the world peace.142 The perception of Soviet labor unions by the AFL leaders was 
the same as the statements of William Greene, president of the AFL: 
The Soviet trade unions are both formally and actually an organic part 
of the state machinery, a branch of the Soviet government and the 
ruling dictatorial Communist Party…The world body of organized 
labor would lose its freedom to criticize the Soviet Union and the 
Communist dictatorship…Thus, the world labor federation would 
practically be transformed, in the political field, into a ‘yes 
organization’ of the Soviet government and consequently of world 
communism.’143 
 
As expressed by William Green, the labor unions in the USSR did not have 
freedom to maneuver without the supervision of the Communist leaders. According 
to Irving Brown, the Bolsheviks, once in power showed little gratitude for the 
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decisive performance of the Russian workers and their elected leaders. After brutally 
crushing the Kronstadt uprising of March 1921, organized at factories in Kronstadt 
by Russian workers as a reaction to unfavorable economic conditions, Soviet leaders 
began a systematic elimination of trade unions as independent representative 
bodies.144  
Soviet strategy to be tailored for labor unions went through various stages. 
Until 1927, there were constant factional struggles in the Bolshevik 
leadership regarding the nature and role of trade unions. At the 
beginning, there were acute differences between those who favored 
truly independent trade union (e.g. Rykov and Tomsky) and those who 
advocated the ‘militarization of labor’ such as Trotsky. Within these 
extreme poles, Lenin, Stalin and part theorist Bukharin assumed 
varying positions. Eventually, all nuances faded under Stalin’s 
subjugation of labor organizations. ‘Trade unions’ became mere 
transmission belts to fulfill political directives of the Party and the 
State. Labor leaders were handpicked by Party bureaucrats as well as 
their duties, orders and policies. 
 
   The opinion of Irving Brown became confirmed when Stalin furthered 
oppression of Russian labor unions and banned strikes. A party coming to power 
defend the rights of proletariat was now in contradiction with itself.  
Although the AFL was outside the IFLU, the CIO’s president Murray met 
President Harry Truman and his secretary general, James Carey and later,  asked the 
IFLU to take a position to support the Marshall Plan. Yet, extreme leftist unions from 
Italy, France and the USSR opposed to it. For instance, secretary general of French 
CGT, Benoît Frachon held that ‘under the pretext of providing assistance to 
European countries, American monopolies wanted to take advantage of the destroyed 
situation of Europe, in order to establish an American domination.145 
The AFL again proposed to international labor unions, regardless of their 
membership to IFTU, organize a conference to support the Marshall Plan. Yet, the 
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proposal was rejected. Then, the British TUC and the CIO offered in October 1948, 
to suspend the activities of the IFTU for a year. When the relations were at a 
stalemate, then both the TUC and the CIO pulled out of the IFTU, on 19 January 
1949 and the labor unions of Belgium, Norway, New-Zealand, Australia, Sweden 
and Switzerland ended their membership, vis-à-vis the increasing pressure of the 
USSR on the IFTU.  
On 5 February 1949, the AFL took the lead to organize the non-communist 
unions under an international organization. Hence, a conference took place in 
Geneva, upon the initiative of the AFL, the TUC and the CIO. It was decided to 
convene in London between 28 November and 7 December 1949 to establish the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). So, the ICFTU managed 
to group 59 national organizations of 52 countries, representing 48.458.000 workers 
and its headquarters was established in Brussels. 
 To summarize so far, AFL-CIO’s prescription for trade unionism was not 
class-based because if it had been so, it would not have been accepted. In other 
words, class struggle was inconsistent with the cooperative labor-business relations 
advocated by the AFL-CIO. For this reason, it based itself on apolitical unionism and 
aimed at increasing the size of the pie through enhanced productivity and collective 
bargaining. In so doing, the AFL-CIO has intentionally or not supported the global 
economic and political status quo.146       
Irving Brown, one of founders of the ICFTU, was saying in an interview 
carried out by Kenan Öztürk in 1988 that: 
Communism was a threat in Europe. Not only in France and Italy but 
also In Greece as well as small countries such as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, almost everywhere in Europe yet particularly in 
France and Italy. There was a widespread economic crisis. Without 
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the assistance of the USA in 1947, we would not have the democracy 
today. In 1945, 1946, 1947, the communists held the majority at the 
unions. There so many large-scale powerful strikes to prevent the 
evolution of economy. The countries were very poor. In order to 
reconstruct themselves, they needed assistance. The assistance came 
from America and the Marshall Plan.147  
 
As it can be seen in the statement of Brown, the AFL and the CIO never 
missed an opportunity to strengthen the unions against the specter of communism. In 
order to realize this strategy under the ‘social component’ of the Marshall Plan, 
Truman administration and labor unions worked hand in hand and American 
unionists have been proud of their efforts and experiences in Europe. For example, 
George Meany in his speech in 1964, president of the AFL-CIO and former secretary 
of treasury of the AFL, explained his working methods and his objective for France:  
We supported the split among the communists in France. When we 
identified that the dissidence and split was obvious, we provided 
money to the party, close to us. We sent money to the unionists of the 
FO; we established bureaus for them; we sent materials and other 
things, absolutely necessary to weaken the communist front.148 
 
The activity report of French labor federation CGT dated from the 27th 
congress containing Benoît Frachon’s statement with this regard:  
Three years ago, the agent of American imperialism, the delegate of 
the AFL, Irving Brown came to France with a remarkable amount of 
dollars to create dissidence. No serious person may think that Irving 
Brown is just a unionist, working on behalf of American working 
class. He is the very agent of the State Department of the USA.149 
 
In the French journal Le Monde of 9 May 1967, former head of international 
division of the CIA, Thomas Braden said the following regarding the cooperation 
between American government and labor unions, in conjunction with the Marshall 
Plan: ‘we created our own proper fronts, by asking assistance of the AFL.’ 
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The affiliation of the AFL-CIO with the CIA began to be revealed to public 
as of late 1965. The Washington Post ran a four-part series (30 December 1965- 2 
January 1966) that was in effect an exposure of Jay Lovestone’s connections with the 
CIA. For the first time, the public was getting a glimpse at the CIA. The exposure of 
its 1961 invasion of Cuba, having turned into a fiasco in the Bay of Pigs and the wide 
circulation of the book the Invisible Government by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross 
(New York 1964) opened the floodgates of publicity on the CIA. 150  A similar 
negative trend was evident in the protests at a number of university campuses against 
the CIA recruiting among students. 151  As a consequence, the Senate set up a 
committee to hear the CIA director. On 28 July 1966, J. W. Fulbright, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked the CIA director Richard Helms at a 
public hearing to explain reports that his agency is involved in union affairs and 
takes part in union elections (New York Times, July 29). Yet, the reply was not made 
public.152 Yet, the fact that the heads of the National Student Association secretly 
received millions of dollars from the CIA was revealed on 14 February 1967. Then, 
there came the confession of CIA’s former director, William F. Raborn in an 
interview with US News and World Report (July 18, 1966) and he explained that the 
CIA gathered information through various persons at the Foreign Service, including 
labor attachés, as elements of the intelligence community.153  
As journalist George Morris put it lucidly, the same Congress enacted laws 
setting up the CIA and the Taft-Hartley Act, severely restricting the activities and 
powers of labor unions as of 23 June 1947. The latter requires officers of every union 
applying for the services of the National Labor Relations Board and a right to have 
                                                 
150 George Morris. CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy (New 
York: International Publishers, 1967), 10.  
151 Morris, 12. 
152 Ibid., 13.  
153 Ibid., 33.  
 65
its name on a collective bargaining election ballot, to submit to the government an 
affidavit that they were not communists. Its purpose was to purge unions of militant 
progressive leadership and opponents of Cold War and eliminate anything un-
American.    
To summarize the connection between the CIA and the labor unions, the 
labor historically has provided a channel through which the CIA could penetrate 
foreign labor sectors. They offered a useful cover for intelligence operatives and 
supported undercover operations. In reality, both midlevel staff and top level 
members of the unions were identified as intelligence agents, who operated in direct 
assistance of the U.S. embassies and the CIA overseas.154    
   After having a brief glance at the formation of the AFL, the CIO, 
international labor movements, the Soviet global strategy on labor based on control 
of workers under the communist regime and on influencing workers in Europe 
through the rhetoric of workers’ brotherhood, the significance of the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan can be understood better. During a period between 
1945 and mid-1960s, tripartite acceptance of American expansionism supported 
many initiatives extending the global reach of the United States such as the Marshall 
Plan, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization and the Alliance for Progress until this consensus was shaken by the 
Vietnam conflict.155   
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3.4. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: Repercussions in the World 
and in Turkey 
To draw the general picture of the initiation of the European recovery efforts, 
on March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman asked for the delivery of a $ 400 million 
aid program to Greece and Turkey. Three hundred million dollars was to be allocated 
to Greece, due to its politically more precarious situation, while Turkey was to 
receive $100 million.156 Truman’s speech was the first officially announced break 
with the Soviets, however on Capitol Hill, the Truman Doctrine was regarded as a 
victory. On April 1947, a bill that approved aid to Greece and Turkey passed the U.S. 
Senate by a resounding majority of 67 to 23; and on May 8, 1947, it passed the U.S. 
House by 289 to 107.157  
Ever since President Truman had called for aid to Greece and Turkey, the 
American Communists, opposing the plan, had been mobilizing, and promoting mass 
meetings, sending telegrams and letters to exert pressure on the Congress.158 These 
reactions in domestic policy led Truman to take measures for an anti-communist hunt 
through the Employee Loyalty Review Board to ensure against the infiltration of 
disloyal persons into the government.159 
As for Turkey, many government officials, deputies as well as President 
İsmet İnönü warmly appreciated President Truman’s message on aid to Greece and 
Turkey. 160 Truman’s speech also had repercussions in the Turkish media. 161  For 
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instance, Cumhuriyet of March 14, 1947 said, with reference to this speech, “a 
turning point in world events; President Truman’s speech calls forth profound 
satisfaction all over the country. Here is the idealistic American to which all 
civilization owes gratitude.” Vatan of March 15, 1947 said that “the message calls 
forth general satisfaction; it is unselfish action devoid of imperialistic designs, a 
unique occasion for our country.”162 As to Vakit March 14, 1947; “A new future in 
the making for Turkey. Truman’s speech is a categorical command for expansionist 
policy of Russia to stop.”  Dailies such as Tasvir, Demokrasi, Son Telegraf, 
Memleket, Tanin, Gece Postası and Ulus163 underlined the significance of the plan 
for Turkey and world peace. In addition, the Democrat Party leader, Celal Bayar, 
along with President İsmet İnönü said in his interview with Kuvvet, on March 14, 
1947 that:  
We welcome with great satisfaction and gratitude that President 
Truman offers aid to Turkey. The Great American Democracy, 
knowing well the dangers totalitarian regimes pose for world 
peace and human freedom, did not abandon the UN Charter as 
only theory but proved it will not hesitate to make sacrifices for 
its realization.  
 
In the meantime, Turkish businessmen and economists were also positive 
about the aid.164 For example, in Ulus, March 14, 1947, economist Mekin Onaran 
stated that although credit terms were not yet known, it was understood that the aim 
of the aid was to strengthen Turkey economically. The President of Ankara 
Commerce Industry and Chamber, Vehbi Koç held the belief that ‘American aid to 
Turkey has also widened world economy and international trade.’  
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On the other hand, Russia was keeping tabs on Turkey in conjunction with 
the Truman doctrine and was very dissatisfied with the situation. For example, the 
Moscow Turkish language broadcast on March 15, 1947 warned the Turks: 
Turks’ acceptance of American aid means their enslavement. 
Turkish people today face a frightening spectacle. They face 
attempts made to replace chains broken in the war of 
independence. Turks know well that Uncle Sam is not lending 
money because of altruism. Even the deaf Sultan [making a pun 
on a Turkish saying and President İnönü’s deafness] had heard 
that in order to control the use of money, Americans will send 
civil and military delegations to Turkey. This means that the 
first condition of aid is control of Turkish economy and army. 
Turkish reactionaries claim American aid will restore the 
Turkish economy, but American papers say the greater part will 
be comprised of war materiel now in Germany and Austria. 
Clearly ancient cannon, old wagons and planes will not help the 
economic crisis raging in Turkey. Atatürk opposed foreign 
loans which enslaved people. Today, American aid will increase 
the burden carried by Turkish people and separate Turkey from 
the democratic world…165 
 
Apparently, the Soviet Union was totally against American aid and 
involvement into Turkey, following its consequent notes, declaring Russia’s claims 
on the Turkish Straits and the rectification of the frontier to give Kars and Ardahan to 
them.166  
Simultaneously, the Secretary of the State Dean Acheson formed an Ad Hoc 
Committee, which was charged with studying the Greek and Turkish problems to see 
‘what situations elsewhere in the world…may require analogous financial, technical 
and military aid on America’s part.’167 The Ad-Hoc Committee carried out a very 
swift analysis of countries which might need American aid, in addition to Turkey and 
Greece, and the Committee prepared two main lists: first, the countries which needed 
economic and military aid were Italy, France, Korea, Iran, Austria and Hungary; 
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second, with less urgent need were as Great Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. 168 Finally, Acheson’s Ad Hoc Committee concluded 
that:  
The broad purpose of the US Aid and assistance is to extend in 
terms of the U.S. national interest the objective recently 
enunciated by the President, Greece and Turkey, by economic 
stability and orderly political processes, opposing the spread of 
chaos and extremism, preventing advancement of Communist 
influence and use of armed minorities, and orienting other 
foreign nations to the US. In addition, the U.S will probably 
continue to undertake to alleviate starvation and suffering as 
such where this action is consistent with US interests.169  
 
 For Turkey, economic assistance was critical to improve its military capacity 
as a priority to deter Stalin. More importantly, Turkey’s inclusion into Truman’s 
program was a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the United States was prepared to 
make a material rather than a purely symbolic contribution to the defense of 
Turkey. 170  As Necmeddin Sadak, Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained, “the 
Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel 
that they were no longer isolated.”171 However, the Turkish Government was very 
cautious at the beginning concerning the extensiveness and continuous American 
supervision of the aid, due to Soviet pressure.172  Hence, between 1948 and 1952, 
Turkey received $225.1 million in economic aid, under the European Recovery 
Program (ERP), and around $200 million in military aid. Although the Turks 
complained that this aid was not enough and admitted to the Marshall Project after 
some delay, availability of such funds was a great asset.173 Over time, the provision 
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of solely military assistance appeared insufficient and anti-Communist preparedness 
required social and economic stabilization and reform.174 Thus, the Marshall aid’s 
scope was enlarged to cover domains such as the economy, agriculture, labor unions 
and nutrition. Production and labor force mattered for the Marshall Plan, in order to 
fight communism on multiple fronts.    
 
3.5 Why Was Labor Important For The Marshall Plan? 
Before moving onto the American influence on Turkish trade unionization, it 
will be appropriate first to understand how labor became so important as to be 
included into the Marshall Plan. To begin with the American influence on European 
labor and its inception, American organized labor viewed the Economic Recovery 
Program and the productivity program, in particular, as a made-to-order framework 
within which to carry its message about trade unions in Europe.   
According to the Labor advisors of the ECA, the productivity drive provided 
the best vehicle by which to ‘export’ the notion of collective bargaining. The duty of 
the ECA Labor advisers and the Labor Information Officers was to advise the ECA 
on matters such as European labor conditions and manpower utilization. However, 
their ultimate goal, from the US labor standpoint, was to pass on the conviction that 
collective bargaining and free-trade unionism were absolutely necessary to the 
rebuilding of strong economies.175  
Support of the labor force through the Marshall Plan was important in two 
respects; first, it increased production in the aid receiving countries and second, labor 
worked as an anti-communist tool. For instance, between 1948 and 1951, Italy, 
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France and the United Kingdom, respectively registered an increase in production at 
98.4%, 80.3% and 67.6%, though living standards were low.176 Working classes in 
Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavian countries were protected by powerful trade 
unions. Joining with the local expenditure of the Marshall funds, they were able to 
work for the amelioration of living standards.177 On the other hand, trade unions in 
Italy and France were poorly organized and more pro-communist.178 
The labor component was already incorporated into the Marshall Plan as of 
1947. American trade unions endorsed the ERP in public statements, emphasizing 
the significance of ‘increased production’ and ‘economic integrations in Western 
Europe.179 They urged the inclusion of the workers into management of the recovery 
program and had begun, even before the Marshall Plan, to cooperate with public 
officials in forming the international aspects of American labor policy.180 The Labor 
Department organized an Office of International Labor Affairs under Philip Kaiser 
and a Trade Union Advisory Committee, cooperating with Kaiser and other officials 
in the War and State Departments, to frame overseas labor policy.181 Furthermore, 
the State Department created the new post of labor attaché, staffed by men with close 
ties to the American trade unions and collaborated with the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) to combat communism in the European labor movement.182 Although 
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there was some resistance at the beginning, a foundation was laid upon which 
individuals seeking to integrate labor into the Marshall Plan were able to build.183  
Kaiser represented labor’s views on the interdepartmental steering committee, 
studying the recovery program. The officials of both the AFL and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) served on the Harriman Committee.184  Finally, the 
Secretary of State, George Marshall, decided to appoint labor leaders to important 
ambassadorial positions and asked the AFL for a list of possible appointees to the 
ECA.185  
Arlon Lyon of the Railway Labor Executives Association, George Meany of 
the AFL and James Carey of the CIO were appointed to the ECA’s Public Advisory 
Board.186  Paul Hoffman, chief of the agency, asked William Green, the second long-
term president of the American Federation of Labor, and Philip Murray, the president 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to nominate candidates for labor 
posts. Clinton Golden, former vice president of the Steelworkers Union, nominated 
by the CIO and Bert Jewell, formerly associated with the Railway Workers 
department of the AFL, were appointed to head the Washington office of labor 
affairs as Chief Labor Advisor to Hoffman.187 Boris Shiskin, former research director 
of the AFL, was appointed to head the Paris office of Labor and Manpower Division 
in order to coordinate all national missions abroad, including Turkey. 188  It was 
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standard practice for the European Cooperation Administration to rely on organized 
labor to nominate candidates for various missions, which had no operating 
responsibilities, but acted in an advisory capacity.189  
The labor advisors sent invitations to European countries to participate in the 
administration of American aid and thus aroused high expectations in organized 
labor. The labor representatives appointed by the ECA were expected to supplement 
the work of the State Department’s labor attachés, to develop ties between American 
and European labor organizations and to formulate policies regarding economic, 
social, technical and other problems that affected European workers and their trade 
unions.190  For instance, Irving Brown, AFL’s roving minister abroad,191 expressed 
these expectations by drawing up a list of six objectives, two of which were: 
First, labor must safeguard collective bargaining, trade 
union standards and agreements and social legislation 
and engage in training and retraining programs and 
above all, maintain the principles of free labor. Second, 
labor must obtain the wholehearted and enthusiastic 
support of the workers in this tremendous production 
effort which will fail unless European labor is aroused to 
all out enthusiastic support.192 
 
The administrators of the Marshall Plan hoped to increase productivity in 
Europe and to this end, technology, labor force and new production means had to be 
introduced to Europe. Europe had been borrowing American ideas since the late 
nineteenth century; yet, American technology advanced dramatically during the war 
and the postwar surveys in Britain and in other European countries revealed huge 
differences as far as per capita output was concerned.193 Surveys suggested that the 
causes of the differences were not just technical, but reflected deep differences in 
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cultural and workplace attitudes between Europe and America.194  Thus, at the end of 
1948, the ECA launched technical assistance projects, engineering schemes and 
production surveys, the goal of which was to stimulate greater efficiency in European 
industrial production through the amalgamation of American production techniques, 
styles of business organization, and labor management partnerships.195   For instance, 
the ECA allocated $1.5 million for technical assistance in Greece.  
Furthermore, the ECA engaged in educating European employers and 
unionists by sending productivity teams to the USA, and by establishing productivity 
centers in Europe, which demonstrated American ideas. In the short term, European 
productivity increased rapidly during the ERP period of four years. Between 1948 
and 1952, the United States channeled some $13 million in economic aid and 
technical assistance to 16 European countries and the aggregate gross national 
product rose more than 30% while industrial production increased by 40% over 
prewar levels.196  
Nonetheless, European managers and workers, being used to narrow markets, 
low volumes, craft skills, labor solidarity, lack of price competition and government 
controls, took time to adapt to a more open mass-production system.197 American 
productivity being so much higher than the European countries in the early twentieth 
century, may be ascribed to factors such as a massive, uniform and protected market; 
the economies of scale, existence of large corporations, better economic organization 
of natural resources as well as favorable interaction between industry and agriculture, 
supported by effective transport. 198  France sent 450 missions to the USA while 
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Britain sent only 66 for labor union and productivity training purposes.199 As for 
Turkey, it sent 600 missions to the United States for unionization training of 2-month 
duration.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on the early Cold War and large scale anti-
communism struggle of the AFL, which did not come out of nowhere yet 
systematically designed the AFL International Affairs section, the CIA, the 
Department of State; and the Marshall Plan’s philosophy of war against and 
containment of the socialist and communist movement, within the working classes in 
Europe, drew the aim of the initiative.  
The war had weakened the European counties and making them more prone 
to the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R.. To a great extent, the AFL’s anti-
communist campaigns were successful though in some countries such as Italy, 
Greece and France, the communist presence in labor was minimized. This situation 
cannot be deemed as a flaw of the American labor strategy; yet, it is correlated with 
the effectiveness of the related governments’ and national labor confederations’ 
solutions.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FIRST ENCOUNTER: 
AMERICAN LABOR AID TO TURKEY 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The first encounter between the Turkish trade unions and the American labor 
unionists, working under the Marshall Plan, started in 1951. It was led by Irving 
Brown, the representative of the AFL-CIO. He traveled by train to İstanbul and 
appeared at the first assembly of the labor unions in İstanbul, without invitation. As 
of that moment, Irving Brown became one of the architects for the establishment of 
Turkey’s first confederation.  
The aim of this chapter is to have a closer look on Irving Brown and 
American know-how trade off as well as training they received. This chapter heavily 
relies on primary sources from the George Meany Archives. Unfortunately, no 
sources were available at the Türk-İş Library in Ankara. The available ones were not 
related with the subject matter of this thesis and the related ones had to be thrown 
away since they were not stored under special condition or the during the coup 
d’états, some of the documents related to early relations were burnt. The best sources 
to prove visits of Irving Brown were the news excerpts from various Turkish dailies. 
So, the research conducted at the Turkish Grand National Assembly has been of 
great help.  
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 This section will illustrate how America’s global labor strategy was 
systematic and fruitful and the labor unions it contributed still survive in Africa, Asia, 
the Middle East, Near East and Europe.  
 
4.2. Irving Brown: an AFL Cold War Strategist 
 Before moving into the activities of Irving Brown and the repercussions of 
his visit, it will be appropriate first to know who he was. Back in 1945, the 
Communists were united, dedicated, and were ruthless taking over the powerful 
industrial unions in France, Italy, Britain and Germany. They took orders from 
Moscow and Stalin had established the World Federation of Trade Unions through 
which he hoped to dominate the workforce in the industrial West. 200  However, 
Stalin’s attempts failed and American labor union leaders, having fought to prevent 
Communist takeover of the American labor movement in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, 
noticed the danger and moved to counter it with the help of CIA, especially in the 
anti-communist struggle in France.201 Its point-men in the field, the executives of the 
AFL, Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, set up office in Paris and worked primarily in 
France, Germany, Italy and Britain. Irving Brown’s efforts were so significant that 
after his death in November 1988, President Ronald Reagan conferred on him the 
Medal of Freedom.202  
To have a glance at Irving Brown’s life, he was born on 20 November 1911 
to worker parents, did a degree in economics in New York and worked at factories. 
Between 1932 and 1942, he was the administrator of Automobile Workers 
Federation and took active role at General Motors and Ford Strikes. He moved to 
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Europe in 1945 to collect information about the situation of the labor unions in 
Europe and expanded his activities such as analysis of freedom of association level, 
financing, modes production and ideologies of the unions as well as establishment of 
contact with them. As of 1945, he pursued the same activities in Africa, the Middle-
East and the Far East. Specifically, his activities in North Africa were against the 
colonization of France and the UK. In 1949, he fervently supported the establishment 
of the ICFTU. In 1955, he was the representative of the ICFTU at the UN and 
between 1973 and 1987, he was again the head of the AFL-CIO office in Paris. All 
his life, he adopted the principle of win-win. He was a legendary unionist. All his life, 
he opened his crusade against the totalitarian Russia. As the European representative 
of the AFL, he provided financial assistance and training to European labor union 
just in the aftermath of World War.203  
Irving Brown’s journey started in Spring 1945. During the war, as 
representative of the AFL-CIO, he worked in close cooperation with government and 
provided intelligence to the U.S. Army specifically through German and French 
Armies. Yet, his connections were already established in 1944 in Washington with 
the German and French émigrés of war.204 His duty was to organize anti-Nazist labor 
movement. In order to go to Paris, he went to Norway first in early 1945 and visited 
all Nordic countries to prepare them for imminent post-war period. Presence of 
American unionists with European origins and the émigrés were most influential 
factors in the establishment of contacts against the Nazis. Brown closely cooperated 
with workers at International Transport Confederation and German transport unions. 
Some of them were keeping tabs on the itinerary of the Nazi trains and providing 
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intelligence to Brown regarding Nazi attacks and Brown was reporting the situation 
to the American armies.205  
 In 1946, he came to Paris and the AFL decided to open an official 
representation office in Brussels rather than Brown’s hotel room in Paris. Along with 
his first target group of German and French unions, he immediately contacted the 
Italian and Greek unions since communism was felt more in these countries. In late 
1946, he went to Italy and Greece. Anti-communist unionists did not know how to 
effectively get organized against the communists ones and they asked for assistance 
from Irving Brown. 206    According to Brown, the Marshall Plan provided both 
economic and social aid in unionization field in Italy and Greece.207 By the same 
token, the first fragmentations among the French and Italian confederations occurred 
on account of dissidence on the rejection of the Marshall aid. The first break-away of 
non-communist unions from the CIGL unions took place in 1948.  
In many countries where communism was on the rise, the communists were 
against the Marshall Plan since it would remodel their economies according to 
capitalism. However, these countries were also in need of economic restructuring and 
many of them got poor because of war. For this reason, the public opinion had hot 
debates on approval or rejection of the Plan. As an extension of American labor 
strategy, Brown also visited Cyprus in 1950. His major objective was to sustain 
solidarity between the Turks and the Greeks because they was immense dissidence 
between both parties of the island. With this end, Brown paid many visits that he 
could not even recall.208 
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According to Brown, the provision of assistance through the Marshall Plan 
was vital because many countries in Europe were poor and the USSR wanted to keep 
them in this situation. There were many violent strikes preventing economic 
restructuring in Europe. Hence, a struggle started within the international union 
confederations on account of the Marshall Plan.209  The strong stance of communist 
unions was posing a threat to the politics of European countries and the USSR was 
using the communist unions as pone to keep these countries under its sphere of 
influence. If there had been no American assistance, democracy-wise, there would be 
definitely a different picture, today.210  
After 1960, believing that his mission was satisfactory in Europe, Brown 
focused over South America, Africa and the Middle East. Within this framework, 
upon intensive work of Irving Brown, the AFILD in South America, the AALC in 
Africa and the AAFLI in Asia were founded respectively in 1962, 1964 and 1968.211  
Irving Brown believed that America needed to assume a determining role in 
forming free labor unionism; and this was the official policy as stated by General 
Eisenhower, after the victory in World War II.212  
 
4.3. Irving Brown and His First Visit to Turkey 
Irving Brown’s definition of duty was clear; to organize resistance against the 
Nazis through illegal channels and help restructuring of German, French, Italian and 
many other European unions, devastated because of war. With this end, the AFL 
mapped out a strategy to fight against communism because Russia had become 
popular among European unionists and in Turkey, communist unionists were not 
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favorable. However, Turkish unions had not met any international confederation and 
did not have any idea about collective bargaining methods.   
When Brown was visiting Greek labor unions in Athens in 17 March 1951, he 
received information from them that Turkish unions would be holding a meeting in 
İstanbul to talk about freedom of association issues. Hence, without getting an 
invitation, he immediately took a train to İstanbul on 18 March 1951 to see the first 
assembly of the labor unions in İstanbul, in March 1951.213 There, Brown made a 
quick gap analysis and informed Turkish trade unionists about collective bargaining 
and the American system. On 17 April 1951, he wrote a comprehensive report on his 
trade union mission to Turkey. The report contained lots of information about anti-
communism and the skills of the unionists regarding the freedom of association.214 
His visit drew the attention of the Turkish government as well as the Soviets.   
 The labor attaché at the American Embassy to Ankara was reporting the 
following regarding the first visit of Irving Brown:  
Since Mr. Brown’s visit, a careful watch has been kept both of 
Turkish newspapers and Soviet-Turkish language broadcasts. 
There has been no reference whatsoever to his visit in the 
monitored Soviet-Turkish broadcasts. As far as the Turkish 
press is concerned, the report has been perfectly clear, 
straightforward and of a purely factual nature.215  
 
Two major Turkish dailies, Ulus and Kudret also paid attention to Irving Brown’s 
visit. For example, Ulus, on March 26, 1951 reported:  
The İstanbul Trade Union Federation held its convention 
yesterday at the Cibali tobacco plant with the participation of 
Irving Brown, a member of the executive committee of the 
International Free Trade Union Federation, as well as with the 
participation of the Argentine Labor Attaché, S. Margia. 
Interests of various labor groups were discussed.  
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Kudret of March 23, 1951 was more informative about the identity and activities of 
Irving Brown: 
Irving Brown, a representative of the International 
Confederation of Trade Unions, established with the 
participation of 52 countries and representing 53 million 
workers, contacted the heads of various trade unions in İstanbul 
yesterday. He told them that 16 million out of 60 million 
workers were trade union members and that he had been in jail 
for having defended labor problems. The heads of the Turkish 
trade unions explained to him their ideas on strikes and stressed 
that it would be appropriate that an article be added to the Trade 
Union Law, permitting trade unions to engage in politics, so as 
to be able to protect the right of workers.  
 
Irving Brown kept a report of his visit to İstanbul. In his report dated April 17, 
1951, after pointing to general organizational weaknesses of Turkish trade unions, he 
stated that it was important to encourage them to get amalgamated into the ICFTU. 
Furthermore, he suggested that Turkey should be included into the Atlantic Pact or in 
some system of mutual alliance or collective security with the Western powers 
against any future aggression by the USSR.216 Brown, in his report, also noted: 
Without such a sense of security, the Democratic world’s most 
Eastern outpost will be weakened and the hopes for a more 
democratic and freer trade union movement will be greatly 
jeopardized. And what is even more dangerous, the lack of such 
assurances from the West will put a higher premium on the 
necessity of doing business with Joe Stalin.217 
 
Thus, Brown came to certain conclusions about Turkey, along with describing its 
political, economic and trade union conditions in his report: 
• First, he suggested that constant visits should be paid to trade unionists 
in Turkey and national trade union centers should be encouraged to 
send representatives to the U.S. and they should be materially supported. 
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• An ICFTU representative should be given the task of working with the 
Turkish unions in the field of working conditions, collective bargaining 
contracts and labor legislations.   
• Immediate relations between Turkey and Greece should be coordinated.  
• The organizational department of the ICFTU should send a collection of 
model agreements, constitutions and related materials to the Turkish 
trade unionists as soon as possible.  
• The ICFTU should officially acknowledge the conversation which took 
place between Turkish Minister of Labor and Irving Brown, the ICFTU 
representative concerning the former’s request that we assist in the 
future trade union work and drafting labor legislation in Turkey.  
• That a representative be sent to other Middle East countries, especially 
to Egypt, before any Middle East conference was held and that 
provision be made for the Turks to play a leading role in this future 
activity. 
• Even though a national trade union does not yet exist in Turkey, 
provision should be made for an observer at the Milan Congress with 
perhaps a representative of İstanbul, Ankara and the Coal Miners.  
• Wherever possible, the democratic countries, especially the U.S.A. and 
Great Britain, should appoint Labor Attachés to their embassies in 
Ankara. 
•  Arrange for Turkish trade unionists to come to the schools and 
educational seminars of other national trade union centers and the 
ICFTU.  
 84
• Draw Turkey further into the common defense and community of the 
Democratic world; no hesitation should be shown or time lost by the 
free trade unions to ask the Atlantic Pact nations to guarantee Turkey’s 
border against aggression by mutual pacts and alliance with the Western 
forces.  
These ten articles constituted the road map of the ECA regarding 
improvement of the labor component as an anti-communist tool. Irving Brown 
conceptualized his philosophy for the course of action to be pursued for and by 
Turkey, the underlying assumption of which was common security concerns and the 
Communist threat. Within this framework, he suggested Turkey’s inclusion into the 
Atlantic Pact. Furthermore, he tailored an active role for Turkey to play in the 
Middle East so that those countries could adopt Turkey as a model. Upon this report, 
education and training activities were implemented and 600 Turkish unionists were 
sent to the U.S.A to receive training about collective bargaining and the American 
way of life. As Brown stated, the American government had an economic aid 
schedule to labor unions in all countries in Europe, including Turkish unionists. The 
assistance was channeled to Turkish government through AID.218 
Ali Rauf Akan, journalist from Gece Postası was also close friend of Brown 
and he accompanied him to İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara as translator. Akan went to 
the USA in November 1951 and he wrote his memoir in a new series in Gece Postası. 
He wrote his memoir on American industry and unions in a news series, in which he 
promoted American way of unionization and life style and evil side of communism 
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as a threat to democracy.219 Ali Rauf Akan went to the USA again wrote a 64 page 
long report in 1952 entitled ‘What have the Turkish labor unions leaders seen in the 
United States?’  
Various groups of workers traveled from New York to San Francisco, Kansas 
City, Denver, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, Knoxville and Washington, D.C. They 
investigated the labor movement and activities in several areas of the United States. 
Everywhere, they found strong, rich and active local unions. That they even had their 
own press, bureaus, newspapers and printing shops was striking for the Turkish 
mission. Like central unions, they had huge buildings.220 What was interesting for 
the Turkish mission was that they observed a health center with 185 doctors, which 
was owned by the Women’s Garment Workers Union. In addition, most workers had 
their own cars. Apartments were provided to families.   
  Akan recorded their observations and the interesting points regarding the 
American way of life, labor, production facilities and sense of liberty. The most 
striking fact he observed was the fact that American labor unions had tremendous 
financial resources. Akan reported that the American worker’s aversion to 
Communism may be explained by his love of democracy and freedom and his 
attitude toward life.221 Akan also observed that the average American is a modest 
person but takes pride in his work, his machine or his new invention. He is proud of 
his apparatus, designs and laboratories just as a good father is proud of the physical 
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and mental growth of his children. 222   This was the image of a hardworking 
American, enthusiastic to produce.  
 Akan also had many impressions about various aspects of the trade unions. 
For instance, American labor unions were not directly engaged in politics and were 
not in pursuit of seats in the Congress or the Cabinet. Collective bargaining was its 
chief concern, but not politics. Workers had individual rights and liberties. Motion 
picture actors also had a union. Workers received 60% of the average national 
income. The American worker was both a producer and a consumer. Women and 
men worked together and young female workers were not under the supervision of 
their parents, but they had self-control.  
 In the meantime, Akan and his mission met French as well as Turkish and 
Greek immigrants from Turkey, working at the Ford and Buick factories, steel, 
textile factories and atom bomb bureaus. They talked about the heritage they shared. 
Akan also reported that Turkey had a positive image due to its contribution to the 
American forces in the Korean War. For example, the boss of a factory, in Chicago 
which they visited, took a gun out of his drawer and said ‘I keep this for Stalin’. 
Akan responded that Turks were also good at using guns, and the boss of the factory 
replied that this had been confirmed in Korea. 223  He added that the heroism 
displayed in Korea led every American to admire the Turkish nation.  As to the 
observation of the mission regarding daily life, they were amazed by the way 
American houses were constructed and remarked on kitchen disposers. Furthermore, 
street cars operated in a way that people did not have to introduce their tickets but 
only identities. Television was common. And every worker had a car and the family 
ties were close.  
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 At the end of two month training, approximately 600 Turkish trade union 
leaders had finished exploring the American labor system and way of life. They 
came back to Turkey to implement what they had seen. They seized upon the 
opportunity to find out about American productivity and how industrial relations 
were organized differently from Communist trade union organizations. Turkish 
unionists were not knowledgeable about the unionization types in France, Italy or 
Britain. Thus, America’s effort to enlighten Turkish unionists about the freedom of 
association, organization and collective bargaining was in fact of pre-emptive nature 
vis-à-vis possible influence of a communist type of unionization.  
The interactions continued both in the form of correspondence and field visits 
paid by American labor representatives to Turkish industrial sites. Brown came to 
Turkey twice after his first visit and in his second visit, he met with the Minister of 
Labor to emphasize the necessity for a Turkish confederation and the Turkey’s 
membership into the ICFTU in order to fight communism. Democrat Party in power 
made a pledge to support the establishment of such a confederation. 
 Finally, a national federation of Turkish trade unions, which was to be known 
as Türk-İş, was established in 1952. On December 6, 1952, Türk-İş made an 
application to the Turkish Prime Ministry for permission to be a member of the 
ICFTU.224 Establishment of such a federation and improvement among the unions at 
the organizational level was important, because the AFL expected; 
 the federation to improve the workers’ standards and conditions, to 
develop increasing social responsibility, and to become the most 
effective force in promoting peace and freedom and in protecting 
human liberty against Communist subversion and dictatorship.225 
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The AFL Free Trade Union Committee appreciated the determination of the 
Turkish federation of labor unions in resisting Communist intrigue and their 
courageous opposition to Soviet imperial aggression.226 It may be observed from the 
foregoing that the language used by the AFL always underlined anti-Communism 
and Soviet aggression and the significance of labor unions in this fight.  
In cooperation with the ECA, thanks to Irving Brown in 1951, arrangements 
were initiated for a one year period in the field of operation of employment service 
organization so as to develop the use of country’ s manpower resources and its 
economy.227 The AFL-CIO representatives visited Turkey very often. To illustrate 
Turkey’s strategic importance to the United States, Irving Brown’s speech, delivered 
at the 71st Convention of the American Federation of Labor on September 17, 1952, 
should be reviewed because it draws the general ideology and the objectives pursued 
by the U.S.A.  
Turkey is becoming more and more the shining star in the NATO 
Constellation. With their twenty divisions on foot and their great 
record in Korea, the Turks are cocky, proud and a nation of tough 
fighters. But now this military reputation is being matched in the 
economic and social spheres as the industrialization of the 
country proceeds. Thanks to American assistance, Turkey 
became a wheat exporter in 1952. This economic and military 
progress is now being paralleled by the development of a trade 
union organization. This is the first time Turkey will have a 
national trade union federation. Thus Turkey is expected to have:  
 
• A democratic, non-Communist trade union leadership coming from the 
workshops of the nation 
• A trade union movement to defend the economic and social interests of 
the workers, permitting labor to participate in the humanization of the 
industrialization process now under way 
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• A labor movement which can help in the strengthening of the free trade 
union and democratic nationalist movement in the Middle East where 
an unholy combination of Communists and extreme fanatic nationalism 
is threatening the independence and freedom of the underdeveloped 
areas.228   
Finally, Brown said that before Stalin succeeded in consolidating his regime 
and in exterminating all resistance, the West must engage a political program to free 
satellite nations from Stalinist control. Accordingly, liberation could come through 
the media such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, as well as efficient 
social and labor policies.229  
The AFL’s cooperation efforts continued in 1953 and 1954, too. The labor 
attaché to the US Embassy to Ankara, Millen Buch was dealing with labor union 
affairs and reporting to the Department of State and the AFL. This way, the AFL was 
following up the developments at Turkish labor unions. For instance, First Vice-
President of the AFL and the head of the International Affairs Matthew Woll sent a 
letter to President Celal Bayar, to call of the trial of 556 Turkish longshoremen for 
stopping working between 16 July and 20 July 1954 in order to obtain better working 
conditions. Woll asked for ‘assistance of the President for the interest of the common 
cause binding the people of Turkey and the United States.’230   
 Mutual relations continued and the AFL supported the participation of Türk-
İş into international labor conferences. However, although the Democrat Party was 
supportive of a docile labor movement in order to consolidate its power, it began to 
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suppress the strikes when the economy of the country for the first time witnessed 
high inflation as of 1954.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how earnest and well-planned the AFL and Irving 
Brown was. American trade unions strongly and without hesitance supported the 
global strategy of their country. Irving Brown’s adventure in Germany, work in 
intelligence field and money transfers from the CIA to the AFL raised questions from 
time to time about whether Brown was a CIA agent. He, himself rejected this 
assumption when Dr. Kenan Öztürk asked him this question. He may not be an 
official agent of the CIA yet one thing is sure that he dedicated his life to 
internationalization of labor movement and dissemination of American way of 
unionization in the bipolar setting of the world.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
  
The Marshall Plan, as a revelation of American exceptionalism, was an 
extraordinarily successful operation in Europe including Turkey. The most important 
fact about the Marshall Plan was that it created a capacity and a spirit of cooperation 
and integration. It gave flesh and blood and moral purpose to the Atlantic idea and in 
the process, made acceptable, possible and constructive the hegemonic position of 
the United States vis-à-vis Europe. It changed the lives of a European generation for 
twenty-five to thirty years.231  
With this end, all the military, economic and social tenets of the Plan were 
realized and to great extent, they resulted in success. In conjunction with the labor 
aspect of the Marshall Plan, Turkey carried out positive reforms in the field of labor 
such as introduction of collective bargaining and improved rights to strike. As Irving 
Brown envisaged, Turkey’s newly founded Federation of Labor was expected to 
direct and control American economic aid as well as influence the general economic 
and social life of the nation232 and the AFL’s overseas anti-communist policy and 
ideology became successful with its policy pursuing to help to establish a non-
communist type of confederation in Turkey.  
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On the other hand, limited number of socialist unionists began to challenge 
the establishment of Türk-İş, the AFL of Turkey and this challenge was 
institutionalized under DİSK (Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation), the CIO 
of Turkey. Hence, this shows that large scale labor assistance to Turkey and efforts 
of Turkish unionists could not clearly eradicate the socialist unionists. The latter 
began to smear again in the 1960s and 1970s and defended the involvement of 
unions into political life. However, this ideology of DİSK caused left and right 
clashes among the collegiate students and the society ultimately creating an urge for 
coup d’états. In other words, the AFL’s and the ILO resolution regarding the non-
involvement of trade unions into political life was confirmed once more.  
This ultimate picture of the 1950s can be also interpreted this way. The 
working class emerged in the USA as of 1860s while the Ottoman Empire’s working 
class was limited. The struggle of American workers for decent working conditions, 
its unionization efforts, hesitance between socialism and capitalism, American 
character’s influence in the choice of the latter, rise of radicalism and its eradication, 
as well as their organizational problems during the 1920s and the financially toughest 
time of the country in the 1930s, have been elaborated in details in order to enhance a 
better understanding of Cold War era.  
 Since American unionization movement has deeper roots, it experiences with 
radicalism in the course of its adolescence, reached maturity during the Great 
Depression and World War II. American labor unions were extremely supportive of 
their country’s Cold War strategy. They knew that Communism was requiring the 
establishment of a system contradicting the individualist and liberal American 
character. For this reason, labor became an intrinsic value of post-world war and 
government as well as the CIA funneled millions of dollars to reshape European 
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industrial relations and modes of production. So far, from various examples, it was 
seen that the labor intervention became very influential in Western Europe while it 
failed in Eastern Europe, remaining under the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Nonetheless, since Turkish labor unions had no idea about the international 
unionization experiences and had to form a working class immediately on the ruins 
of the Ottoman Empire following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923; 
it was fragile to communism and could not experience its due course. America’s 
contribution had been of great help in terms of improvement of organization skills 
and collective bargaining. Yet, the right to strike remained as an unresolved issue 
until 1960.   
Democrat Party government made a pledge to support the development of a 
labor confederation vis-à-vis any possible rise of communism among the unions. As 
Irving Brown stated, money was channeled by American government through AID to 
Turkish Ministry of Labor. Since no record is available on the amount of money, this 
side of the story remains blurry.  
Democrat Party per se benefited from America’s contribution to Turkish 
labor field to a great extent since there was a similar psychology of Red Scare in 
Turkey. Thus, elimination of communist actors would remove obstacles from its way. 
In order to strengthen its military and economy, the Democrat Party in Turkey 
carried out fruitful development programs, in coordination with America, between 
1950 and 1954. However, after 1954, the economy began to plunge. Foreign debt 
doubled between 1950 and 1959. 233  Hence, America decided to suspend the 
economic aid until further measures were taken by the government.234 Furthermore, 
Marshall Aid had ended in 1952. However, the Plan had promoted the relations of 
                                                 
233 Mustafa Albayrak, Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti: 1946-1960 (Democrat Party in Turkish Political 
History) (Ankara: BRC Basım Matbaacılık, 2004), 360. 
234  Namik Zeki Arel, Ulus  (9 March 1960). 
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Turkey with the United States of America vis-à-vis the Communist threat and opened 
new international vistas for American-style organized labor in Turkey, “the 
Democratic world’s most Eastern outpost.”   
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